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1INTRODUCTION
1. Problem of the Thesis.
The problem of this thesis is the investigation of Ha.rt-
mann ' s concent of teleology as presented in his ethics and its
relations to causal and t eleologica.l monisms.
The possibility of human teleology and the nature of the
feel©©logical act are fundamental to Hartmann 1 s entire ethical
system. It is purposive action that makes morality possible.
Only through the realization of ends can ideals be accomplished,
can value come into being. It is quite natural then that Hart-
mann would oiive a great deal of attention to what he called
"the finalisti c nexus."
Hartmann ' s chief motivation seems to be the dignity of man.
Hartmann feels that providence and foreordinat i on, which are
derived from and relative to teleology, are the attributes of
divinity,. Man's ability to set up ends and work for their
realization is a fact. Thus he feels that
ethics does and must do what in the eves of the pious
may be blasphemy; it gives to man the attribute of
Divinity. To him it restores what he, mistaking his
own nature, discarded and ascribed to Divinity. Or,
to express it differently, it allows Divinity to step
down from its cosnic throne and. dwell in the will of_
man. The metaphysical heritage of G-od falls to man.
The attributing of such powers to man, Hartmann is convinced,
Hartmann, ETH, I, 282.

is only possible if "teleology is the peculiarity of human
nature.""*" Thus the idea of a G-od on the one hand or of a
complete mechanistic universe on the other hand must be given
up. Either view would destroy the autonomy of man.
It becomes necessary then first to investigate more fully
just exactly what teleology means for Hartmann, whether such
teleology is incompatible with a mechanistic universe, whether
such teleology for man is incompatible with a teleological
universe, and whether ""artmann s own view of a world as
mechanistically or causally determined with the exception of
man is a coherent hypothesis. This involves also a, consideration
of the relation between the teleological determination of man
and the causal determination of the world exterior to man,
thus bringing in Hartmann 1 s categorical laws of dependence and
his solution of Kant's third antinomy. Finally we shall
consider the intrinsic nature of teleology itself as a value
or an ileal and its place in the realm of ethical being.
2. Previous Literature.
Very little has been written on the teleological concept
of Hartmann as presented in his Ethics . In fact no compre-
hensive consideration of the subject has been undertaken. We
are limited, then, to parts of reviews, articles, and books,
1
Hartmann, ETH, I, 232.

3and to sections in a dissertation, all of which aeal with it
only indirectly in relation to the rest of his work.
The Int ernational Journal or Ethics ha s carried a number
of articles on the general subject o^ Hartmann's ethical theory.
Aside from the review of the book Ethi cs itself, the first
important article was contributed by Sidney Hook and published
in 1930. This was followed in 1932 and 1933 by a series of
three articles on the subject of axiological ethics by Howard
2Eaton. The second of these dealt with Hartmann directly and
contained a consideration of what Eaton calls Hartmann s in-
determinism. A.G-. Walker, in an article in 1938 on the
relation between Hartmann and Perry, deals more directly with
the nature of teleology as set forth in Hartmann and its
relation to freedom. In 1939, Roger Hazelton published two
articles dealing with Hartmann. The first of these, entitled
"Human Purpose and Cosmic Purpose
,
11 considers Hartmann's re-
jection of cosmic teleology as motivated by the desire to
establish the autonomy of man. Hazelton* a second article,
entitled 11 On uartmann's Doctrine of Values as Essences," 3
while informative, is not particularly relevant to our purpose.
1
Hook, Art. (1930), 179-210.
2vaton, Art. (1932), 20-36.
3
Walker, Art. (1933), 37-61.
4 i
Hazelton, Art. (1939)
.
5Hazelton, Art. ( 1939
)
2
.
•
4Two books have been written with sections dealing with
Hartrnann's teleology. Werner Brock touches the subject in his
An Intr iu ction to Contem p orary "ernan Philosophy , pub1ighed
in 1935- In German, Johannes Kessen has given Hartrnann a good
deal of consideration in his '.Verphil os ophie and deals not only
2
with the law of stratification, but also with the antinomy
between Ood and man resulting from Hartrnann's teleology.
The most complete consideration of Hartrnann's teleology
as it affects value, freedom, and 3-od appears in a dissertation
by David lino, written for Boston University in 1941. We
shall make numerous references to this valuable and scholarly
work.
An article by Sidney Hook, "A Critique of Ethical Realism,"
recognized the importance of Hartrnann as a modern ethical
thinker by saying,
The writer wishes to state that, although sharing
neither Hartrnann's metaphysics nor his ethical philos-
ophy, he feels that this book in virtue of the de-
tailed contributions it makes to specific ethical
problems is the most important treatise on the sub-
ject in the present century.
Hook's rejection of Hartrnann's metaphysics would tend to involve
a rejection of his teleology as well. He never deals with the
^rock, ICG-P, 39-91.
2
Hessen, !.YP
,
164-165.
3
Ibid., 210-211.
4
lino, CHE, 23-24, 29, 36, 33, 100-102, 137-145, 151-160.
5
Hook, Art. (1930) , 181
.
f
5subject directly. However, he does touch upon the laws of
stratification as categorical when he says
,
^artmann is now able to prove the fundamental cate-
gorical la\7 for the entire realm of values --natural
and moral. The good attendant uoon the realization
of a va"!ue.is proportional to the gravit" of its
violation
.
Even in this he is only considering stratification in the realm
of value. Thus he actuallv leaves teleology untouched.
Eaton herins his article, "The Unity of Axiolocrical Ethics,"
"by pointing out that the final third of Hartmann's hook adds
some ver TT significant concepts to what Eaton calls "indeter-
minism. He contends that Hartmann s indeterminism is mainly
anti-theological in nature and is directl^ opposed to Augustine's
theology. Hartmann insists that a thoroughly teleological world
would completely exclude free will and that in such a world
ethical existence would be impossible. Oosfflic and human
teleology are mutually exclusive.
Eaton points out that if hartmann had to choose between
Augustinianism and the causality of materialism he would take
the latter as being more hospitable to morality and any amount
of freedom. This choice of causality rat' er than teleolory in
the physical world is the basis of Hartmann's theory of will,
a.ccording to Eaton, ana makes the arguments of many who try to
refute indeterminism irrelevant. The will itself is deter-
1
Hook, Art. (1930), 199.
2
Eaton, Art. (1932), 32.
t
mined from a decisive element within rather than from without.
Hart oann does not attempt to overthrow the causal theory but
rat'-or turns it to his servitt by positing the level of person-
ality which uses the laws of causation in its own service.
Eaton calls this the "'switchman' theory of indeterminism. M
Eaton characterizes Hartmann ' s theory of indeterminism as
f ollows
:
Hartmann' s argument of indeterminism is another
return to Aristotle's entelechv, another version of
"emergence." Any such theory may prove helpful as
furnishins a classification, cut is hound tOgbe
pernicious if it pretends to be explanatory.
Any theory of freedom, according to Eaton, is fallacious. The
actual existence of freedom is entirely superfluous to the
realT. of ethics.
These attempts are all misguided, for the problem of
determinism is as irrelevant to ethics as 'it is to
physics or natnesaat ics . The true goal of ethical
investigation must be... to make ethics orjthonomlc
,
i.e., a science of the rightness of axi ologi cal
judgments .
^
It might be wise for Eaton to consider how this "rightness" can
be discovered if man is completely determined, and if it is
discovered just what difference it would make if man is unable
to freely choose the correct.
Walker in the article entitled "Perry and Hartmann; Anti-
thetical or Complementary?" points out Hartmann 1 s close relation
lT?aton, Art. (1932), 33.
2
Ibid., 34.
3 Ibid., 36.
•
7to Aristotle in his analysis of the three stages of the
finalistic nexus.
This process of actualization which is nan's obli-
gation is three-fold. It involves, first, the setting
up of an end to "be striven f or ;... second , the tracing
backwards through the temporal order to determine
the claim of means to the desired end, so th t even-
tually, in Aristotelian fashion, he comes to the first
or immediate means, which represents the first action
he ought to do: third, the patient following through
in straightforward sequence of the whole claim of
means to the desired end.
Walker shows the closeness of '"artmann 1 s theory of freedom based
on his teleology to Perry's theory of value as interest. He
points out that personal freedom means that
the man himself must be permitted to choose which
value he shall accept and, even more independently,
he must be permitted to den^ or refuse to follow a.
given value. Surely this position comes dangerously
close to saying that in the last analysis it is the
interest of the person, his own choice of the value
as a force in his own life, which constitutes it as
a value for him in that situation.
That Hart T,.ann would deny any such subjective criterion of value
as interest of the perso n alone is evident from the barest
perusal of the Ethics, but that he successfully lodges Walker's
charge is by no means so evident. Hartmann's independent
ideal realm of values is in a peculiarly vulnerable position.
It needs a place of residence.
Hazelton's article on "Human Purpose and Cosmic Purpose"
comes closer than anv of the above to an analysis of Hartmann's
Walker, Art. (1938), 42.
Ibid., 48.

8concept of purpose and his denial of cosmic teleology. He
points out that Hartmann 1 a contention that cosmic teleology
is anthropomorphic is hardly a valid criticism. He says,
If it means to assert that in such attempts human
preference takes precedence over factual and lo ical
pigor there is much to support it, but if it means
that it is necessary, or even possible, to reach an
understanding of the world in which man lives by
eliminating man and his ways from that world, an
absurd sort of philosophical nihilism has been im-
plied. It may be unfortunate that human knowledge
must be human, but it is obviously true. The ego-
centric predicament and the value-centric predicament
operate in all knowing as well as in all doing.
Hazelton shows that Hartmann 1 s motivation for denying
cosmic teleology is the desire to establish the full autonomy
of man. Hartmann 1 s theory is overly man-centered. He seems
to be so absorbed in man that he is willing to accept almost any
theory that leads to his desired conclusion. "Hartmann ' s ac-
ceptance of an out-rnoded mechanistic naturalism, his essence-
theory of value, the marked absence of any clinical psychological
data, and a persistent postponement of ultimate metaphysical
issues, indicates his absorption in the human problem o er se ."
Hartmann ' s denial of cosmic teleology while an extremely
metaphysical problem 1 is not based on metaphysical grounds,
Hazelton insists. Hartmann strongly asserts, "Metaphysics must
heed ethics; not ethics, metaphysics, " Tazelton would agree
Hazelton, :-rt .(1939) 1 , 660-661.
2
Ibid., 662.
3
"Hartmann, ETH, I, 291.
••
9with Hartmann that moral action cannot wait on metaphysical
theory, but he feels that eventually ethical theory must be
based on sound metaphysics if it is to maintain itself.
Hartmann simply answers the problem by automatically transfering
pract'cal demands into theoretical propositions without ade-
quately investigating and substantiating their validity.
It is no defense of the autonomy of man simply to
assert his superiority injthe world, Tven the plain
man wants to know if this assertion is true, becoming
thereby a beginner in metaphysics .... It is more
honest to recognize the metaphysical orientation of
ethical questions at the start than to assert the
phenomena, discard metaphysics , then smu^^le in as
much metaphysics as yoiji need to make the phenomena you
have chosen plausible.
Hazelton is willing to accept the phenomena of ethical life
which Hartmann points to as genuine data. However, he feels
that these phenomena in turn need explanation. The very
existence of teleology and ralue points to at least a minimal
cosmic teleology in two senses. Hazelton savs,
The first is that of conditions favorable to inten-
tions, since the environment does support, or at
least does not invariably destroy, the intentional
modifications of human organisms. The second is that
of realized intentions already made fact, since a
purpose once attained becomes historic matter-of-
fact, leaving its mark on the objective order.
Hartmann fails to account for these very evident facts. Hazel-
ton then proceeds to set forth his own conceptions of intention
and ourpose. We shall consider Hazelton 's analysis and
1
Hazelton, Art. (19 39
J
1
,
664.
2
Ibid., 665.
••
compare it with Hartmann's later.
While lino's dissertation deals more directly with the
conflict of intuitions of value ( Wertgeftlhl ) and coherence in
Hartmann's ?t
h
i c
g
certain sections deal directly with the
problems dealt with in this paper. His third chapter is con-
cerned with Hartmann's rejection of theism. He points out
"Hartmann sees an antinomy "between ethics and religion because
he fails to see that religion is a cooperation between Sod and
man." Hartmann's claim that teleology is a peculiarity of man
and if found anywhere else it cannot be known is contrary to
"both fact and reason. 3-bd is actually a principle of coherence
but Hartmann is blinded to this fact because of his basically
"incoherent theories of G-od, of our moral life, and of the
world." lino maintains that Hartmann's basic categorical law,
i.e. the law of strength which says the lower determination is
always stronger than the higher, is not coherently justified.
Hartmann sees this law as if it itself were the criterion of
truth. lino says,
Hartmann depends on this categorical law... as the
criterion of truth. With him' this law rules our
thought and intuition; only in accordance with it
can we hold anything before our minds , but never
without it or in opposition to it.
To this lino strongly objects:
Hartmann's categorical law, or any and every law in
^"See Chap. I, sec. 1, below.
2
Iino, CHE, 192.
3 Ibid.
«
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philosophy, must be judged by its adequacy to interpret
all the fact that there are in experience as a whole.
The categorical law is untrue to the whole life of
ideal purpose.
Here lino ntrikes at the ^eart of the problem. If Hartmann
can substantiate his categorical laws of dependence the rest
of his atheistic system naturally follows. While his analysis
of the finalistie nexus itself does not depend on his cate-
gorical laws yet his application of the results most certainly
do
.
3. Plan of the Thesis.
The plan or method which we shall attempt to follow in
this thesis will be essentially one of internal criticism based
on first more or less sympathetic exposition of Hartmann's
point of view followed by investigation of the internal
coherence of Hartmann 1 s position and consideration of added
evidence for or against the point in a_uestion. To criticize
any point of view it is necessary first to understand just what
that point of view means to say and its adequacy in light of
tbe facts of the experience with which it deals. It wil] also
be necessary to bring in other points of view for comparison and
contrast
.
However, internal criticism alone is not sufficient. It
is necessary further to investigate Hartmann' s thought in
relation to the rest of experience and to a general metaphysical
1
Iino, GHE, 153.
•
12
outlook. As an example it haa seemed advisable to investigate
wartmann ! s protest against a teleologieal world In light of
Eowne's criticism of an impersonal world-view, and in terms of
the evidence from evolution. The attempt has been made not
to unjustly apply external criticism until adequate investi-
gation of the internal claims presented has been :riade.
The first chapter deals with Hartmann's analysis of the
struct re of teleology and the Importance of teleology to
man. This is followed in the second chapter by the limits
Hartman discovers to human teleology and the meaning of accident.
In the third chapter examination of Hartmann's categorical laws
of dependence, his criticism of causal monism or mechanism, his
criticism of a teleological world \riew of the idea of G-oeL,
and his own system of deterministic pluralism with its implica-
tions has been attempted. The final chapter contains an investi-
gation of t v e relation of teleology to freedom and the place
of teleology in the realm of value.
Each section will contain first an exposition of Hartmann's
point of view followed bv internal and external criticism in so
far as it is demanded by the content of Hartmann's thou ht.
Free use has been made of other authors, but we have attempted
to present the thought of these men either to point out contrast
and agreement or because of -:ore coherent statement of parti-
cular situations in the light of the evidence. The attempt has
been made to avid the use of quotations as proof merely because
4
13
of the eminence of the author in question or "because o n personal
agreement with the point of view of the author.
)
•
CHAPTER I
THE NATURE OF TELEOLOGY
1. The Structure of Teleology.
Nicolai Hartmann 1 s consideration of teleology and analysis
of teleological action stems from his consideration of the
relation of the ethical Ought-to-Be and value. The Ought-to-Be
is an inherent quality of goods and moral qualities. Hartmann
feels that values in so far as they are ideal essences do not
need authorization from any subject. But, in the real world, a
subject is needed to affirm the Ou^h^-to-Be issuinsr from values
2in contrast to what already is.
This does not mean, however, that values are not already
existent in their own sphere or that they do not continually
affect and become realized in the sphere of the existential
categories, the so-called real world. T-artmann thinks of values
as principles which stand in the nature of first causes in the
Aristotelian meaning of the words. He says, "From them proceed
creative energy, productivity, fashioning, actualization. " J The
Ought-to-Be has an energy which demands attention from the
personal subject in whose oower it is to brins: about the reali-
zation of values. The oower behind this energy is value itself.
lu
artmarm, ETH, I, 248.
2Ibid., 262.
3Ibid., 272.
4
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Aristotle speaks of original causes as having four meanings.
In one of these we mean the substance, i.e. the essence
(for the 'why' is reduced finally to the formula, and
the ultimate 'why' is a cause and principle); in
another the matter or substratum, in a third the source
of the change, and in a fourth the cause opposed to
this, the purpose and good (for this is the end of all
generation and change)
.
Hartmann thinks that values are causal in all of these way3
.
He says, "In the presence of the valuational principle the
existent loses its equilibrium, it falls into motion and it tends
to something beyond itself. Value is the center of gravity, the
'first entelechy * ." 2
The Aristotelian concept of final cause is misapplied.
Hartmann thinks that nature is the one realm in which it does
not hold. However, it does fit the realm of ethics exactly.
In ethics there is the assumption of a point arrived
at and the assumption refers to the substantial essence
of the orinciple. Value is at the same time power and
a directional point. As something substantial it does
not impel the process from behind and push it forward,
but draws it to itself. It is a point of attraction
which t^e Ought-to-Be indicates and towards which the
real tendency in pursuit of the Ought-to-Be proceeds.
It is here, then, in the field of value that one finds the
proper realm of teleology. This teleologv in the realm of
ethics is a nexus, a type of determination of realitv directly
corresponding to the place of the causal nexus in the realm of
nature. As a tvpe of determination teleology is higher and more
Aristotle, Vet., 933a25-30
!
Hartmann, ETH, I, 272-273.
Ibid., 273.
**
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complex than, causal determination, and is oeculiar to the
realization of what ought to be.^"
In the full realization of the ought
,
however, Hartmann
thinks that we find not only teleological determination but
prior to this a primary determination as well. This primary
determination is the determination of the subject by value it-
self, i.e., it is the process or intuition through which the
subject becomes aware of values. It is a beholding of the
ideal realm, the intrusion of value upon consciousness. Rather
than beincr teleological, it is a cognitive determination, a
determination of knowledge. It is the presence of "dominating
and conditioning" principles within the ethical field.
It is the secondary type of determination with which we
are particularly interested. Upon the discernment of value
the subject may bring a'cout the actualization of the ideal
within the real through willing and. acting. This is the realm
of the finalistic nexus. For the subject the realu in which
the finalistic nexus dominates is all-important.
It is a wide domain which the finalistic nexus controls.
All acts proceeding from person to person carry this
nexus in themselves as a categorical form. Such are
all striving, willing, acting, all wishing, longing,
hooing, all unspoken and uncompreh ended tendencies
within the mere attitude of mind. For to this belong
not alone the conscious setting up and uursuit of ends;
ever-' activity of the subject has essentially the
structure o£ this nexus. All practical intention is
finalistic
.
1Hartmann, ETH, I, 273.
2
Ibid., 274.
r
17
In the finalis'.ic nexus, as in the causal, every member
depends upon every Other one in ordered sequence; however, the
structure of this, dependence is entirelv different from that of
the causal nexus. The causal nexus follows the order of time,
the event is determined by its antecedent. In the finalistic
nexus the order is reversed. Everything is determined by the
end. Instead of cause and effect, ends and means prevail.
The power of the causal nexus is that of a push from behind,
while the source of the finalistic nexus is the attraction of
the end. "The "orior existence of the end is the condition of
the whole. 1,1
The dominance of the end raises a whole series of questions.
Just what happens? How does the end attract the process? In
order to answer these questions it is necessary to analyze more
exactly the steps in the teleological process. Hartmann
^i :l6S tTi© *o^*oc^ss I'l^o tiny*©© "o"1 '" sl g 0 s or* s Is s • In Ii^ms JT ^ 27 s t
step, there is found an answer to the question as to how the
end can exist before its actualization. The end can only
exist as an end set up in anticipation by consciousness. This
involves "the setting up of the end by the subject, an over-
lapping of the time process, an anticipation only possible
to consciousness and a talcing of one's stand regardless of the
order of time."
1
Hartmann, ETH, I, 275-
2
Ibid., 276.
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The second step is the one particularly distinctive of
the finalistic process. This is
the return determinati on . . .of the means by the end,
beginning with the means nearest the end and so
backward to the first means--the Present one—which
is close to the subject; where the link just ahead
(in the backward process) has as its end the subse-
quent one (next preceding in the backward orocess)
and is determined (somei,imes, chosen) by it.
The third steo follows the temporal order and makes use
of the causal nexus. It is "the actualization of the end, its
real attainment through the series of means, wherein the relation
of means and end which was reversed in the backv/ard process is
changed into a straightforward continuous relation of cause on
effect." This third step is the only one of the three that has
the character of a real process in the course of objective
events other than the consciousness of the willing subject. It
is a step fully in accord with and making use of the causal
nexus by which the subject actually shapes and intrudes upon
"cosmic events." Thus, finalistic determinism is able to insert
itself harmoniouslv into the causal order.
In fact the existence of the causal order is absolutely
necessarv to any teleological action; it is the precondition
of teleological action. There is no place in Hartmann's system
for indeterminism . Ke says,
In a world without law and determinism, where everything
was by chance, an accent who pursued ends could not hold
his own at all; but this signifies that in it action,
1
Hartmann, ETH, I, 276.
rr
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the actualization of ends, would be an impossibility
,
because the agent could never force what causes, as
means, would induce the desired effect.
As pointed out above, the second stage is the one which
gives the finalist^ c nexus its peculiar character. While it
does not exist on the level of actual events, it does determine
these events through its determination of the subject's activity.
It acts as a guide pointing out the way but exists only in
consciousness as does the end until the completion of the entire
process. It is the second process which makes possible the
actualization of what ought to be. The Ought-to-Be sets forth
the end but does not give the means. This second stage seeks
to discover t v e proper means.
In the finaliatic nexus we find a duplication of the end.
It "appears first as the predetermining end of thought under
which guise it acts as a center of gravity for the entire process.
Finally it appears as the actualized and accomplished end not
only of the third stac-e but of the entire process. In its
first appearance the end is the thing of value as posited by
and in consciousness while the final form contains the end as
"the Real determined by the principle."'" Between the positing
of ideals and their actualization lies the whole of human
striving and achievement. These two phases of the end are vet
reallv the same end. In their subject matter they are the
1
Hartmann, ETK, I, 277-
2
Ibid., 279.
r
same. They are the same ideal "before and after realization.
This again shows Hartmann's dependence on Aristotle,
which dependence Hartmann readily admits."'' Under his definition
of nature in the Physica t Aristotle says
What is potentially flesh or bone has not yet its own
'nature', and does not exist 'by nature', until it re-
ceives the form specified in the definition, which we
name in definition what flesh or bone is. Thus in the
second sense of 'nature' it would be the shape or form
...of things which have in themselves a source of
motion. ... The form indeed is 'nature' rather than the
matter; for a thins is more properly said to be what
it is when it has attained to fulfillment than when it
exists ootentiallv.
Thus, the first form and the completed form are one. The com-
pleted form simply is the realization of form itself. Nature
as form would compare to Hartmann's first end. Nature as the
unity of form and matter would be uartmann's final end.
Aristotle's nature is the form to potentially realized acts
in the same manner as Hartmann's end, i.e. as a center of
gravity for the entire process of realization. Again Hartmann
would say that Aristotle has a correct analyzation of the
teleological process but has simple misapplied it to nature
when its natural and only real manifestation is as a process of
realization of values, of human ends.
The subject or the person is drawn into the finalistic
nexus in two different functions. First, after he has discerned
or discovered the values he must affirm them as ends. Next, he
Hartmann, ^TH, I, 279.
2193a36-b8.
1r-
r
1must will and act to bring these ends about. "'hile these two
functions are different, yet, basically, they are as identical
as the first and actualized ends pointed out above. Their
identity is the identity of the subject himself and the unity
of his actions
.
Thus we have in two senses a circular course involved in
the finalistic nexus, i.e. from end to end and from affirmation
to completing action. T- Towever, the circle is very seldom com-
plete, never exactly closing. The reason for this is that the
subject is continually changing, at least to a alight degree.
Because of the lapse of time between the setting up of the end
and it3 actualization the intentions and desires of the subject
may change. Only in a qualified way does he represent his former
p
volitions. This inconsistency accounts for the fact that so
many good intentions are not realized even when nothing exterior
to the individual blocks their fulfilment. Hence the fact that
"hell is paved with good intentions."
As we have pointed out above, the power of finalistic
series is not a blind or crude coercion as that of the causal
nexus, but it is rather a positive attraction from ahead. The
subject sees what he is doing and foresees the results. The
entire series is predestined by the idea of the end with the
result that the whole, the completion, is prior to the parts of
1
Hartmann, ETH, I, 280.
2Ibid.
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the series. Essentially it is a sync-otic process.
Dr. David lino emphatically says of Hartmann's description
of the teleological process that it is not valid. In support
of this he quotes correspondence from Dr. Brightman to the
effect that
He ^Kartmann/ substitutes a logical order for the
actual order. There is no wa^ of Droving what 'the
means nearest to the end' are until we have experi-
mented and inquired. In sho^t , his second sta^e is a
function of his third stage."
While to a certain extent this is a just criticism, yet it seems
to overlook at least one important ooint. By the "means
nearest to the end" Kartmann does not necessarily mean the
exact last phase or step "before the end in any exact or vigorous
sort of way. He simplv is pointing Out that before we act
toward the realization of an end we must have some idea of
"the real tendency toward that point." If we did not have
some idea of the way in which the end mi^ht be brought about
we would have little chance of realizing it. Then we would be
complete].-- dependent uoon chance variations in the causal nexus.
'.7e could sit forever and a dav contemplating ends, but we would
not progress toward their realization.
It is hardlv conceivable that "artraann should think that
the means could be arrived at even in thought without some sort
Hartmaan, ETH, I, 281.
2
Iino, CHE, 144-145.
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of empirical basis on which to draw. Rather, in the search for
means of the second steu two possibilities present themselves,
both of which seem to be empirically true of most teleological
.judgments. Tn the first place the subject has all of his past
experiences to dray/ on. He has observed how cause and effect
bring about certain conditions around him, and he now simply
reviews the causes that will bring about his desired effect,
the end in view. Tn the second place the subject continually
experiments and inquires in his thought with means that might
lead to his end. Hartmann stresses the fact that both the first
and second steps exist only in consciousness.^ Bright-nan re-
cognizes this by say ins that Hartmann's is a lorrical order.
This second step seems to be most logically necessary if the
teleological process is to mean anything at all.
Brightman's further comment, that the "second stage is a
function of his third stage,' does not seem to be borne out.
If it were a function of the third sta<?e it would be an action
stap-.e following the causal order and a?ain would be subject
simoly to chance. That tMs is not the case is self-evident
from the fact that it is a t eleolosical process. Perhaps orig-
inally the second sta^re is derived from the third in that it
is possible onlv in the light of past experience, but as far
Hartmann, ETH, I, 277-278.
lino, CHE, 144-145.
3Ibid.
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as any present teleological action is concerned it becomes a
stap-e of its own no longer dependent on or derived from its own
third stare.
lino goea on to say,
Further, his phrase "ein an sich zeitloses Tebilde"
is not philosophically sound. It is clearly indicated,
"by the context that Hartmann means human consciousness
by the ' Tebilde'. But since human consciousness
exists in time it cannot be timeless.
What exactlv does Hartmann say? "Only a form in itself timeless
can move freely against the temporal current, can forestall it
and return against it. Thought, the content of consciousness,
can do this. Of course the conscious act cannot." Perhaps
this is an invalid abstraction of the ought from consciousness,
and yet, the important point is that one can think about the
future which is not in the present time. Certainly the idea
as idea is timeless though appearing in a consciousness in time.
Thus the form ( G-ebllde ) is not the vhole consciousness but the
ideas about the past and the future within consciousness, ideas
experienced bv all of us. Hartmann a;oes on to say, "Just as
onlv a consciousness can freely overlap the time-process, so can
only a consciousness return from the future back to the present
--from a final end to the first means which is within the power
of the subject." Hartmann here is not saying that consciousness
—
-
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is not in time. All he is asserting is that consciousness
alone is time -transcending in the sense that one is able to
think of past and future, to set up ends which will not be
realized until a future time. Surely, lino does not mean to
deny this ability to consciousness! If he does, then conscious-
ness is absolutely unintelligible present awareness, and there
can be no teleologieal action of any kind. Time and change
must be referred to intelligence as their source, as Bowne
points out."''
That such tine-transcending activity of consciousness and
thought is not only possible but necessary to an adequate view
of consciousness is made evident by Brightnan in his Introduc t ion
to Philosophy . He says,
No account of mind is complete or philosophically
sound that considers the temporal features of mind
without also considering its tine-transcending
features and the relations between the two.
He further emphasizes this aspect of consciousness when he says,
"The essence of the self is to be temporal--to transcend time
and vet be temporal at the same time.' Thus there is nothing
contradictors or impossible in saving that the second step of
the teleological process, as a steo taking place only in the
thought of the conscious subject, runs counter to the form in
which the causal time nexus works when objectively carried out.
Bowne, MET
, 193-
2
275.
3From notes on a lecture by Prof. Brightman on Hegel's
Lo.qik
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As such it does assume a form in itself timeless but one which
takes place during a specific amount of time since lino seems
to demand such a qualification.
Hartmann, as we have seen, closel^ analyzes the t eleolo-^ical
process a3 anplied to human purpose. The advantage of his
analvs\s is that when he gets through purpose still remains,
^ome such close analysis is vitally needed as an answer and
check upon the naturalists who have analyzed purpose away into
"biological processes of <?;ands, motor action, etc. Behaviorism,
Dewey's naturalization df intelligence, and Perry's interest
theory of value have all been attempts in the naturalistic
direction. But as Kazelton points out, "What takes place here
is often not analytical reduction at ail but simple substitution
of one set of naturalistic concepts for the purposive phenomena
with which one began.""'" While Hartmann perhaps does not take
the physiological and neurological side of purpose sufficiently
into account, yet he does work with ourpose itself and tends
to keep the total behavior, it conscious causes and results in
mind. Best of all, he ioes not explain it away.
Hazelton himself proceeds to analyze purpose in human
behavior as intention. Ke points out that intention has a triple
meaning. It may be considered first as "what is intended."
secondly as "intending," and finally as "the starting point of
action. In snite of the fact that his second step is largely
1 P
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made up of "the origins of behavior In 'not ivat ions derived
from the past," the similarity between Hazelton's and Hartmann's
views is remarkable. Hazelton's "what is intended" is the same
as Hartmann's oricnnal end. As pointed out above, Hartmann's
second ste^ would have to be chiefly based on knowledge of
past experience. Thus Hazelton's "intending" and T-Tartmann's
second step are much closer toget er than first glance might
indicate. The main difference is that while Hartmann's second
step is entirely a matter of consciousness, Hazelton's may also
include unconscious or subconscious patterns of behavior.
Perhaps Hazelton is mere nearly correct here than Hartmann.
Hartmann's third step is the realization of the end through
the causal nexus. Hazelton's third point, the starting-point
of action, is at least the beginning of the same thing, the
difference being that he does not complete the process in his
analys la
.
Hazelton ureses the identity of past and final goal even
more strongly than does Hartmann. He says, "loals actual lv
serve as laws or motives and that, far from bein«: a mere pseudo-
existence in the realm of t^e not-yet, they are in experience
directive of its continuous course."^* Hartmann's similar
emphasis was brought out above in showing the similarity of his
view on the sameness of first and final end to Aristotle's con-
sideration of form in nature. Hartmann more explicitly stresses
the reality of the end in consciousness when, discussing the
hazelton, Art. ( 19 39 )
2
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659.
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first determination of value before the finalistic nexus be-
comes action, he Bays,
The first rnember--we might call it the primary deter-
mination—ia that of the subject by the value; it con-
sists of the discerning, the sensing, the beholding of
value. This, which leads initially from ideal to real
Being (since the sensing of value is a real act), is
naturally no", finalistic.
Hazelton breaks decideiy with Hartmann, however, on the
oossibility of purpose in nature. Hazelton divides purposive
action into two types, according to our experience of it.
Teleology is the external observation of purposive action while
intention is our own experience of purpose as we carry it out.
He says, "Intention is immediate, teleology is intermediate;
the one is intrinsic in its nature, the other is instrumental.
The first we see from the inside, the second from the outside,
which makes all t v:e difference." Hartmann 's consideration is
entirely devoted to what hazelton calls intention. As we
shall see, Hartmann leaves no place for teleology in nature;
the reasons will be forthcoming later. The reason for bringing
Hazelton 's consideration in here is to show that the analysis
of purpose can go farther than Hartmann has carried it.
However, there is no particular reason for limiting the term
teleology to the observation of external manifestations of
purpose as Hazelton does.
Perhaps a more accurate analyzation <6f external and
1
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internal purpose is made by Albert Hofstadter in an article
entitled "Objective Teleology" in the Journal of Philosophy of
January 16, 1941. Hofstadter differentiates between "subjective"
and "objective" teleolo-y. He describes subjective teleology
as "teleology as experienced immanently, from a vantage point
wl thin the teleological process, by the agent who forms and has
purposes, seeks and uses means, and enjoys or suffers outcomes."^"
In turn he describes objective teleology as "teleology discovered
extrinsically , from a vantage point outs ide the teleological
process, bv the inquirer after truths about that process, who
therefore qua inquirer does not participate in it though he may
qua agent." This distinction has the further advantage over
Hazelton of being, for the time being, non-committal about the
question of teleologv in nature. Hofstadter is simply saying
that there are two ways of looking at the same process, a fact
which Hartmann seems to overlook. This leaves the way open so
that, should action similar in every respect to the objective
structure of teleology in persons be discovered in nature, an
inference to the effect that nature might be teleological as
well as man would be possible.
Hofstadter's analysis of the subjective teleological orocess
is also very similar to Hartmann 's as was uazelton's. He says,
"The unitary attribute of the teleological actor is not the
possession of end alon e, or sen s itivity alone, or t echn ique
lu
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alone, "but of all three in Inseparable continuat ion . " Again
the first step in both Hartraann's and Hof stadter ' s analysis is
the end, defined by the latter as direct edness . Hofstadter'
s
second step is sensitivitv which he defines as the circumstances.
This, while not as complete as Hartmann's formulation of the
second step, involves the same thins, i.e. the awareness or
discovery of the circumstances by which the end can be reached.
Hofstadter's third step is technique or the connecting paths
which involve the steps towards realization in the causal nexus.
Of this L:ofstadter savs , "A purposeful action is directed to
its end always in a concrete set of circumstances and along
2paths of connection between antecedent and consequences."
Here, it is true, the second step is more closely a part of the
third than in Hartmann , but it is still important in its own
right
.
Hartmann, thus, in his careful analysis of teleology has
opened up the way for further work in the field. He has shown
that analysis does not necessarily destroy, but rather elucidates
the nature of the purposive act. To be sure he has left some
important considerations out, such as the effect of the bio-
logical organism on the teleological act and the distinction
between subjective and objective teleology; however, he has
accomplished a sound besinnincr of investigation of an important
and often ill-understood aspect of the entire teleological
Ho.fstaatsjf , Art. (1941), 34-35.
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question, i.e. an analysis of the act itself.
2. The Importance of Teleology to '.Can.
As is the case with a number of other prominent 3-erman
thinkers, e.g. Yarx and Nietzsche, Hartmann ' s main motivation
seems to be the dignity and worth of man. This is nowhere
brought out so clearly as in his consideration of teleology.
"'any thinkers before Hartmann in the history of thought had
olaced axioloecical determinations above ontological ones. In
reviewing the men who had expounded such a theory, Hartmann
mentioned five thinkers in particular. First, Plato felt that
value was higher than being in that he held the good to be the
apex of the value of ideas. In both strength and dignity he
held nature to be higher than existence. He felt the
good to be the highest and all embracing of the Ideas. ^ In
turn Aristotle held the highest determinate of the universe to
be the highest good. The Stoics made the good both the primary
principle of morality ana ox the cosmos.-' In so far as "the
scholastics identified the ens realissi mum and the ens perfec-
t is si mum they followed in the same tradition. Kant through the
primacy' of the practical reason made value paramount. Hartmann
feels that Fichte and Hegel accomplished the same end by estab-
1
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lishing a "teleological dialectic of universal reason."
Hartmann claims that in one sense this tendency was quite
correct in so far as values are categorically superior to
being, but that it was all wrong in making value the stronger
2determination and in making this determination cosmological
.
He came to this conclusion for two reasons: first, because of his
analysis of categorical relation which we shall discuss later,
and secondly because it involves a failure to recognize man's
proper place in t^e cosmos. Re argue4that if there were a uni-
versal and real teleology of values in the world independent of
man, then. reality would be based on valuational principles as
constitutive. But this would mean values would be ontological
categories and thus fully actualized apart from man. Man then
would be superfluous but could not exist. This, however, is
directly contrary to the facts of ethical life. Hartmann in-
sists that onlv in so far as there are values dependent on man
for their realization can man have a legitimate task in the
world. The very dignity of man is based upon this task of the
actualization of value through the teleological orocess. This
is the ability that separates man from all other entities in the
3
universe, that sets him apart.
V.a.n as the realizer of values mediates between the real
world and the ideal. Thus he is restored to his own high place
Hartmann, ETH, I, 242.
2Ibid.
3
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in the cosmos In ' that he alone is continually creating reality
of value, is giving to the world a 'igher -north, Hart.mann says,
".'"an alone callus in himself a higher law whereby he--or more
correctly the law within him- -creates in the world, or from Man
--Being brings forth into Being, that which was prefigured in
its ideality." The process whereby man does this creating,
brings about the realization of value, and generally justifies
his existence is the teleological process. One might very
easily say that it is his ability to determine teleolo^ically
tbat makes man man
.
As has been pointed out above, the dynamic of the teleo-
logical orocess, of the finalistic nexus, is a pull from ahead
rather than a blind push from behind. As such it is a seeing
DDOcess in that the subject is aware of what he is doing. :ore
than that it foresees, to a certain extent at least, the end in
view. By anticipating the final point the subject actually
predestines the whole series in the direction taken. Hart.mann
says
,
In this anticipation there is a two-fold meaning: fore-
sight and pr edeterminat ion--providence and predesti-
nation. Both are a concern of the subject as a setter-
uo of ends . Tn both inheres the basic character of man
as a moral nersonalitv. "^or it is precisely these anti-
cipatory acts, wherebv he is the carrier of moral
values and dtsvalues.
This fact gives us our basic imslght into the metaphysical
nature of man. The two main attributes of divinity are pre-
1
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destination and providence. In so far, then, as man sets up
ends he is divine. Since the setting up of ends is an empirical
ethical fact, man's divinity cannot "be denied.
To him it /ethics/ restores what he, mistaking his own
nature, discarded and ascribed to Divinity. Or, to
express it differently, it allows Divinity to step
down from its cosmic throne and dwell in the will of-^
man. The metaphysical heritage of G-od falls to man.
To Hartmann
,
then, teleology is o p utmost importance to man. He
makes the further assertion that teleology is a peculiarity of
human nature, for teleolo^v is only possible "in a conscious
entity capable of knowing and striving.
He fails however to take into consideration the fact that
there may be another or other conscious entities besides man in
the universe. He justifies this omission by saying that if
teleology can be found elsewhere in the world we are in no way
aware of it. Such an assumption he feels would be purely
speculative and would have no empirical verification. Only in
man do we actually meet teleological phenomena.
Man's capacity for ourposive activity certainly seems to
be his most characteristic quality. It seems to be, if not the
only, at least his most important means of actualizing value.
Tt g^'ves him his reason for being, if he has one. But whether
it raises him to the heights Hartmann would indicate is not so
certain. As shall be shown later, there seems to be rather
striking evidence that there is some other purposive agent
1
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besides him or at least that there is purposive activity going
on not entirely nan—originated . It would seem that the fact of
man's existence itself would need some sort of explanation
beyond simple <h ance configuration of the causal nexus. To cast
G-od out of the universe automatically because of human teleology
and in order "to give man glory" seems a bit hasty. If Hartmann
is to succeed in such a gigantic task we shall have to have more
evidence than we have vet considered. Furthermore, it is doubt-
ful- whether providence and "credest inati on are the only charac-
teristics of divinity.
r
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CHAPTER II
LIMITATIONS OF HUMAN TELEOLOGY
1. By the Causal Nexus.
As pointed out in the last chapter, Hartmann considers
man's ability to work towards ends, or his teleological nature,
his most important and distinguishing attribute. This attri-
bute differentiates man from most other existent beings or
entities. Thus it is most important that man's working out of
ends or purposes be at least partially successful. However,
in the exercise of his teleological nature man by no means
finds the way unhindered. Man lives in a world in which his
strivings may be blocked by any number of obstructions. First
of all, he lives in a world oredominantly determined by the
causal rather than the finalistic nexus, at least so it appears
from t^e human point of view. If man is to succeed in the
realization of his ends he must impose his own form of deter-
mination upon the causal order.
The problem is complicated by the fact that neither the
teleological nor the causal nexus is made up of a straight line
series. Rather both are networks in which not single causes
and effects influence each other nor single means and ends.
Each spreads out into a complicated, interacting series.
As the latter ^the causal nexus/ spreads out into a
system of sequences, into causal action and reaction,
r
and in reality always appears onlv as a constituent
part of such a system, so the finalistic series spreads
out into a similar serial system and in concerto never
consists otherwise than in such a system* Only the
interlacing is here more complex because the deter-
mination of ethical reality is a "blend of causes and
ends
.
The two systems come into immediate contact in the third
sta.cce of the t eleolo^ical act. Here the finalistic ser'es is
utterly dependent upon the causal series for its completion.
The finalistic series is so interlaced into the complicated
causal series as to aim at redirecting at least part of the
intertwined strands in order to "brine!; about a different result
in the light of ends. In a highlv figurative sense a competition
is set up between the two systems. Man - through finalistic
determination struggles for the upper hand, for control over
his environment. If he succeeds the total process is directed
toward his ends, value is actualized by the forces of the
causal nexus itself which, according to "artmann, is funda-
2
mentally indifferent to value.
Man under no conditions can entirely free himself from the
causal nexus. To use Hartmann's language, he is "voked to
this texture, outwardly and inwardly." As an ontolo?ical
being, what Hartmann calls a natural entity, i.e. as a physical
beins, man is completely determined by causal relations. It
is in addition to his causal nature that man is also axio-
loerically determined, can seek for the realization of values.
1Hartmann, ETU
,
I, 297.
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Man thus is a teleological bein<r amona; causal entities. Only
in man do we find a meeting of the two types of determination,
this meeting being dependent upon his twofold nature. Both
determinations are alwavg present.
In every inclination, disposition and mental atti-
tude both are contained and possibly are in conflict
with each other. For onl^ r conditionally is the
axioloffical determination ever masterof the onto-
logical
.
That is, the success of the teleological determination of man
is utterly dependent upon the amenability of the causal nexus.
Accordingly a definite limit is set on human teleology by the
causal nexus
.
As pointed out in the previous chapter, it most certainly
is true that man's effectiveness as a teleological being is
dependent upon the existence of the causal nexus and upon its
regularity and law, its determination. It follows conversely
and necessarily that the causal nexus in turn imposes limits
upon man's effective striving for ends. This is simply to
say that man must work with the material given, must use this
given material as means to his ends, and cannot accomplish or
brino: about ends bevond the possibilities cf the means. It is
also empirically evident that even among possible accomplish-
ments man often is thwarted by lack of complete control. The
causal nexus has a way of netting dangerously out of hand, of
miscarrying man's imposed determination far beyond the intent
of the determiner. The aim of science is to understand so
1
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thoroughly the relations of the causal nexus that man's control
will increase to a maximum. Yet, no natter how thoroughly the
causal nexus is understood, it will continue to Impose definite
limits on man's teleological activity.
That the causal nexus is fundamentally indifferent to
value as Hartmann claims is by no means certain. The burden of
proof lies with the aasumer of such an attitude and Hartmann by
no means substantiates his statement. To assume such a state
of affairs is to assert that the entire universe with the ex-
ception of man is axi ologically neutral. Such a view is far
from empirically justifiable. Its implication would be that
the intrinsic goods and evils of consciousness are
purely accidental products of an order which (apart
from the narrow realm of consciousness) contains no
intrinsic goods nor intrinsic evils, and neither
intends nor implies anything valuable or dis-
valuable
.
That Hartmann actually means to assert such a view seems in-
comprehensible in the light of his later analysis of the realm
of value. That he cannot mean what he says at this point and
be consistent is made evident by the following; passage in the
second volume of the Ethics:
In a certain sense one may say that everything, which
exists, somehow falls practically under the cate-
gories of values, that everything in the world, even
the most remote and indifferent, is in the perspective
of ethics either of positive or negative worth. The
same universe, which in its totality underlies onto-
logical Phenomena, belongs also in precisely the same
totality to ethical phenomena. It is no less a world
of goods and evils than of things and their relations.
Brightman, FOR, 271.
4*
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At leas£ it is as radically the former as it is the
latter.
Just how the world o^ the causal series could he entirely in-
different to value and at the same time belong "in orecisely
the same totality. . ./with7 ethical phenomena" is rather hard
to understand. Perhaps all that Hartmann means "by this in-
difference of the causal world, to value here is that as a
causal nexus, this nexus, as such, is not a conscious process
directed toward the realization of values. However, even this
statement is not entirely unclebatable , for should indications
"be presented that teleology is not confined to man alone, then
it would "be entirely possible that the causal nexus is not a
"blind determination but is itself to a certain extent an ex-
pression of nurpose. This possibility will have to be reserved
for later consideration. At least we can say that Hartmann is
not entirely self-consistent at this point.
Hartmann contends that man as a physical being or as a
"natural entity" is entirely causall Tr determined. "Thile almost
everyone would agree that to a large extent this is true, yet
not everyone would agree to the unconditionality of the state-
ment. That man's most characteristically physiological actions
and reactions are intimately affected by his mental states, his
aims, desires, purposes, is a common fact attested to by not
onlv oersonal experience, but psychology in general, the im-
portance of the attitude of the natient in medical treatment,
\J
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and the somewhat cuJrious success of such religious movements
as Christian Science. To be sure, most of the vital functions
of the body proceed relatively independently of the conscious^
teleologleally minded person, vet these very vital functions
are not only often affected by the purposes of the conscious
person but themselves seem to manifest a Mgla degree of purpose
and working for ends. Thus we may question the purely causal
and axiologically neutral nature of these organs.
2. By the Community.
As pointed out above, the finalistic series spreads out
into a complicated system of interlaced means and ends. This
svstem of the finalistic nexus is in some respects quite
different from the system of the causal nexus. Since in the
causal system the causes are not working necessarily towards
a predetermined end or ends they may come together in any
number of combinations without any upsetting results. When the
component parts come together the process simply proceeds ac-
cording to law--dif f erent causes result in a different effect.
"And if certain elements, given at the same time, cancel one
another, this only means a compensation for their working to-
gether, not their elimination or destruction, certainly not a
disruption of the causal determination^
The situation in the finalistic nexus is quite different.
Hartmann, ^TH, I, 298.
r«
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Here the final raeniber or the end has been set uo and any dis-
placement of this end tends to cancel the entire series at-
tached or leading up to it. Thile causes -nay be indifferent
to the resulting effects, means are never indifferent in respect
to their ends. "If the end is frustrated, if it is made im-
possible by the crossing of another finalistic train in the
same course of a complex finalistic event, the causes cease to
be means to this end."^" The means have been determined in
Light of the end and the value which has determined the end
itself. It i3 therefore evident that not all ::eans can combine
to reach the desired end.
Accordingly in the interlacing of finalistic trains some
trains are incompatible with others, even as some ends exclude
each other. When these incompatible ends come in contact they
not only destroy themselves but the entire series of events
leading to them as well, and all sink back down into the lower
blind determination of the causal order.
Two or more finalistic series or trains may exist in the
same limited event but only under very limited conditions, i.e.
they must be directed towards similar related ends which actually
are in harmony with each other. "The extent of ethical reality
of course provides room for an unlimited variety of ends, but
not in one and the same limited process, and not in one and the
same volition." This variety of ends is necessarily somewhat
Jffartmann, ETH, I, 298.
2
Ibid
. , 299
.

43
limited in comunity life. The major ends in the corn .mini ty must
be joined into a harmonious system. A corn-unit 1 '- of ends and
interests must be established or else the ends of each individual
will tend to cancel out the ends of the other individuals. "A
community which is organized on this principle consists of a
community of ends and interests, and the interlacing of fina-
listic trends in it is an interlacing of identical interests."''"
But this does not mean that the individuals in the
community need lose their individuality. Within certain
limits divergent interests may be interlaced. Thus, in so far
as the ends do not directly contradict each other, a community
of means to different ends may also exist. The same elements
may act as both means and ends for different individuals.
Thus the community should have a unitv of general ends and at
the same time a diversity amoncc particular ends. This very
unity through and with diversity enriches the ccmunitv and
makes the ideal community possible. Hartmann expresses this
as follows:
Here a wide field opens for oossible adaptations and
combinations w^ich outwardly an pear as compromises
but, viewed metaphysi cally as a whole, are the only
Dossible direct paths of the finalistic nexus and the
true forms of a teleolo^ical individual in a community
of such individuals.
Dr. Brightman would go even further and insist that it is
the shared ouroose of individuals that constitutes a community.
1
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The clarity and intensity of the consciousness of shared
purpose actually determines the relative strength of a com-
^ munlty. When the consciousness of community puroose is atrong
and clear, the community is strong. If the reverse is true the
community is weak. Totalitarianism cannot he built on race or
geographical proximity alone but must be based on solidarity of
purpose. Thus the dictator crushes out groups and ideals that
divide the people. "The harshest regression of free purpose
is thus a dialectical proof of the necessity of free purpose
m any communitv.
Thomas Hill Green stressed the same idea, the importance
of common ourpose for the existence of the community in his
idea of the common nrood. He says,
Some sort of community, founded on such unity of self-
consciousness , on such capacity for a common idea of
permanent good, must be presupposed in any groupings
of men from whigh the society that we know can have
been developed.
Thus the community stands in a double relationship to purpose.
First, purpose or community of purpose is absolutely necessary
to the existence of the community, but, second, the common
purpose of the community to a certain extent limits the freedom
or the rancre of purpose of the individual.
3. The Nature of ¥oral Conflict.
)
•
As pointed out in the last chapter, human teleology is
Brightman, FOR, 334.
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limited first by the "bounds or extremes of prevision and pre-
determination, and secondly by the transi toriness of purpose
within the self. In this chapter two more limits to human
teleology ~ave become evident: first, the limitation of the
material of the causal nexus, and secondly, the divergence of
finalistic trends in the life of the community. Now we come to
what Hartmann considers the most serious of the limitations, a
limitation imposed by the nature of values, a clash between the
"chief aspects themselves of the values—the aspects which
alone can determine ends
.
The individual setting out to act as a moral being very
often finds himself confronted by several different tasks, each
of which is imposed upon him by his consciousness of values.
The difficulty arises because these very often are conflicting
trends which cannot all be carried out. This conflict among
the trends points to a conflict or a plurality of directions in
the nature of the Ou^ht-to-Be which in turn points to a
plurality and conflict in values themselves—at least so
Hartmann thinks. Hartmann points out and concedes that
If t^ere were a single concrete supreme value,
from wh ' ch all others could be derived, such a conflict
could not properly arise—or at least only through
so-ne effect— of the valuational consciousness. The
unity of value would give a synthesis of values.
Put, he insists, the realm of values is empirically not con-
stituted in any such manner. Our consciousness never reveals
1Hartmann, ETH, I, 301.
2
Ibid., 300.
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a unit" of value above the valuational diversities. We only
experience varieties of specific and often confi icting contents
of values. This fact more than any other accounts for the
changes in the purposes and strivings of individuals. He says,
"They /the changes/ are due to the presence of valuational
conflicts in the pure and ideally s elf-exist ent nan if oldness
itself." 1
While this conflict does exist, Hartmann is willing to
admit that in this variety of values all do not stand separately,
that the majority do combine in "a certain harmony." Neverthe-
less amon-T the values there are some which definitely contra-
dict each other and the contents of which in concrete cases /»
exclude one another and yet both of which ought to be recognized
and brought to fruition.
For an example o t" such a conf 1 ict we shall turn to his
analysis of values themselves. Hartmann considers justice
and "love of the remotest" as standing in such a conflicting
relationship. He says,
The relation of justice is similar. With it also
there is a conflict. Cf course justice does not
entirely shut out the distant perspective, as love
of the nearest does: it requires a wide vision. But
love of the far distant is not on that account just,
it cannot be so. It must disregard the single indi-
vidual and even the community, for it aims neither
• at the individual nor the existing community, but
at the type. ....In the eves of justice men are equal;
and, in so far as they are equal thev ought to be.
Love of the remotest sees the opposite: men are not
equal, and not onlv in nature and character, but also
1
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47
ethically they are not of equal worth in their human
potentiality.
In such cases as these, Hartmann insists, a different kind
of conflict from those listed above arises. This is a conflict
of a higher kind. The conflict is not between moral and im-
moral, between right and wrong, but between moral and moral,
between wrong and wron^. T^ o matter which wav a person acts he
is violating one value though fulfilling another one at the
same time. TJ o one who stands in such a position, and all of us
do continually, can escape without incurring guilt.
The seriousness of this limitation on human teleology be-
comes evident when we realize that all the other limitations we
have mentioned are external and can to a certain extent be
overcome, but
here arises an inner, essential limit to purposive
activity, which is inherent in the realm of the
possible ob.iects of purpose. No teleology- -that of man
or any other, in case there be anv other- -can transcend
tMs boundary; it exists not alone for purposive
act'vitv as a real trend, but even for the setting up
of ends.
If the values involved were under the control of man or
were relative to man alone the situation would be different,
but they are not. The conflicts are not caused by man and he
has no way of bringing them to an end. ^he reason for this is
that the values for Hartmann are not rooted in the actual
world but in an ideal world of self -exist ence such as Plato
1
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would construct. Man has no power over the self-existent realm
of ideas. The clashes are anons; the axiolo^ical determinations
themselves. These clashes are of such a nature that even if
there were "a divinely oerfect, world-ruling providence and
foreordination" or G-ocL he would be limited and hound by them.
Unfortunately there are certain basic confusions present
throughout Hp.rtmann's Ethics of which he evidently is never
aware. In the first place Hartmann, in spite of the fact that
he has produced a three volume work on value, never defines what
he means by value. At best he only hints at a meaning. Early
in the book Vie says,
His /man's/ apprehension is from the first a pre-
ferring of one thing to another. His portion in
this comins and going of events is participation with
feeling, interest, the sense of valuing. Impartial
calmness of thought is a later distillation. And
here everything depends upon the energy, reach and
right orientation of the evaluating sense.
Here we have such words as "sense of valuing" and "evaluating
sense." The onlv words offering a clue are "feeling" and
"interest" which seem to be used in apposition to sense of
valuing. If interest and feeling were the clues to value,
Hartmann would be very close to Perry, but it is clear that
this is not the case as Hartmann goes on to talk: about values
as "primarily and throughout ideal self -existents . " Thus it
is not clear what Hartmann does mean by value. The evidence
1
I, 38.
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Indicates that whatever he means, he has included too much in
the term. How values could both be feelings and interests and
ideal self-exist ents is Slightly beyond comprehension.
This falure to define value leads to the confusion of
values and ideals. It is necessarv to distinguish between the
present experience of value and things we would like tc exper-
ience or values not yet realized. The two are not the same and
confusion of the two leads to numerous difficulties. For the
sake of clarity, then, we shall define value as follows:
"Value means whatever is actually liked, prized, esteemed,
desired, approved, or enjoyed by any one at any time.*
Kartmann seems to sense this indirectly when he speaks of
feeling and interest as sense of value. This is also very
close to Perry's definition of value as "any object of any
interest." It then becomes necessary tc differentiate between
a value and an ideal. "An ideal is a general concept of a type
of experience which we value. "^ An ideal may also be regarded
as a standard by which to judge present experience. As such
it acts as a norm and is of the essence of Hartmann 1 s Ought -to-
Be. It becomes evident at once that Hartmann is not talking
about values when he talks about "the pure and ideally self-
existent manif oldness , but about ideals, concepts of experience
Brightman, POR, 88.
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which we value, which may act and do act as ends of teleo-
logical actions.
Hartmann 1 s confusion of the ideals and. values is even more
evident at other ooints in his exposition. In the introduction
he says
,
When once we have ^rasped the fact that the very same
values which alone can ccuide our purpose and action
are a thousand-fold realized in life "by persons and
situations, that they confront us in relations and
events, surround us all the time, carry us forward and
fill our existence with light and splendor--far beyond
our limited power of comprehension- -we stand face to
face with the second ethical question: Ifhat are we
to keep our eyes open for, so as to participate in
the world's values?
This is an extreme example of the mixture of the two meanings
in the same sentence. Just which does he mean "by value, values
as ideals which "alone can <?uide our purpose" or values as
existent which "surround us all the time, carry us forward and
fill our existence with light and splendor"? The two are not
the same, and this ^artmann fails to see. Only ideals or con-
cepts of experience which we value can act as ends or goals,
and t^ese do not become values until they are actualized, until
the teieolo?ical orocess is comulete. Thus he seems auite con-
fused when he says, "a value, indeed, always and necessarily
corresnonds to any commandment or end." His whole chapter c
"Values as Principles" * is based on this confusion.
1
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Secondly, Hartmann $v44*rf -fr^m a confusion between value-
claim and true value. He would be quite correct from an
empirical standpoint in asserting that contradictions and in-
coherences exist in our value-claims. The term value-clai rn
sj moly expresses the fact "that accompanying every value there
is the explicit or implicit claim that the value now felt is a
true value." Certainly many of our value-claims definitely
contradict other value-claims. The value-claim of promiscuity
is directly opposed to the value-claim of chastity. The im-
portant thine; to remember, however, is that these are value-
claims that must be examined and tested before they can be
asserted as true values.
The value-claims must be verified and this can only be
done by a process of relating the particular value experience
to the rest of val^e exper'ences and experience as a whole in
order to test the consistency, inclus iveness , and coherence of
the claim. Thus a true value
is what Is still value after the teaming of our empir-
ical values bv rational norms (rational meaning, logi-
cally consistent and coherent), and after the tests
of analysis, oractical consequences, and coherent
wholeness have been applied to the experience.
Havine? gone through this process it is evident that true values
do not contradict each other in quite the way that Hartmann
insists. The contradictions arise from inadequate examination
bright man, FOR, 91-92.
2
Ibid., 93.
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of the value-claims and from failing to keep the totality of
value in mind.
Hartmann would probably still object that in experience
positive values do conflict. He would undoubtedly point to
such extreme cases as those where truth must be sacrificed to
save a lif e »w»j>rko* Fichte's famous dictum that he would tell his
wife the truth if it killed her. Certainly there seems to be a
conflict here, and yet there are two things which Hartmann
overlooks. In the first place, in such a situation the value
would accrue to the savins of a life and not to telling the
truth. Thus there is one course or plan of value which in such
a situation cancels the value of telling the truth for truth's
sake. The second thing is that such a contradiction can only
arise where morality is given a non-empirical, strictly formal
character. Hartmann allows himself to be put into such a
oosition by asserting the separate real existence of value -apart
from the individuals who realize the value.
This leads us to the third confusion. Hartmann says that
the unity of value would ?ive a synthesis of value in which
these conflicts would not be inherent but would be the result
of some defect or incompleteness of the valuational consciousness
Put he asserts that no such unifying orinciole exists even
though admitting, as pointed out above, that the majority of
values do combine in a certain harmony. This dogmatic assertion
that the unifying principle does not exist seems to be a
doubtful one, to say the least. The very process of sub-
0f
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stantiatlng value-claims into true values would seem to contra-
dict such an assertion. At least a number of men in the field
of ethics have found a unifvi.ng principle at work and have
pointed to the empirical nature of such a orinciple. Hecrel
found such a principle in the full self-realization of the
human spirit. 1 T .H. G-reen found such a principle in "the full
realization of the capabilities of the human soul. Dr.
Bright man emphasizes the unity of experience in the system of
value in the dialectic of desire based on "the mind's search
for completeness and coherence."
The whole phenomenon of the coalescence and interdependence
of values points to their unity. No single value is ever ex-
perience alone without reference to the other values. Parti-
cular values tend to act more as centers of organization for the
other values rather than as independent fixed entities such as
Hartmann attempts to maintain. While not everyone is value-
conscious enough to experience anvthing like a complete coales-
cence, to use Dr. Priihtman's phrase, or interdependence, to
4
use W.G-. Everett s phrase, yet everyone does experience this
phenomenon to a limited extent, and certainly it is a far more
rational normative ideal to work towards an adequate coalescence
'Hegel, PGR.
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of value than a mere knowledge of values as separate, atomistic
entities of the Hartmann variety.
There is no reason why in the example cited from Hartmann
justice and love of the remote cannot be reconciled. To con-
sider these ideals as opposed i3 to separate them artificially.
A love of the remote, or Nietzsche's Fernstenliebe is love of a
person for what he can "become and involves justice to the extent
that a person should be allowed to develop his capacities to
the fullest. Justice purely in the light of the present without
taking capabilities into account would be a justice of the
blindest sort.
Thus we may conclude, that Hartmann 1 s limitation of human
teleology by the conflict amono" values is a false statement of
the situation. To be sure, there is a limitation here, but it-
is a limitation imposed not by the basic incongruity among true
values and true ideals but bv human i~norancej lack of exper-
ience, inability to judge, and failure to be coherent and in-
clusive in the realm of values and ideals.
4. Accident as a Teleological Concept.
Man is so constituted as a teleological being that he is
able to turn natural forces tdhi? benefit, can harness them to
his ends. Without this power he wov.ld fall prey to all the
forces in nature that chanced to be in his way. Man's own
mechanical energy is very slight compared to the natural
powers around him. This masterv that he exerts rests wholly
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in his teleologies.] nature. But unfortunately man's mastery is
not complete. The f'nalistic series, as pointed out above, can
only he completed by the causal series which is essentially,
indifferent to the particular end man has set up. Man conse-
quently is not always able to anticipate in its entirety the
effects the causal nexus will bring about. .Can's ability to
predict is definitely limited in its range and unfortunately is
often of a discontinuous nr.ture. As a result of this the
process injected with the causal order may develop contrary to
his wishes. It is very possible for human purpose to mistake
its croal just as error may arise when human knowledge mistakes
and misinterprets its object. The results in such instances
are not the results which have been willed: they are essentially,
then, non-t eleolo^ical or accidental.
This is verv close to uegel's conception of accident
presented in the section on moral it" f in the Philosophy of
Right . He savs,
In proposing to work a change in the given external
realm, the self-acting will has a general idea of
the circumstances. Eut as these circumstances limit
it, the objective phenomenon is accidental and may
contain something quite other than one's general idea
of it: the subjective will claims as its right that,
in any of its deeds, it recognize as its own and ,
be held responsible for only what it proposed to do.
Hartmann feels that this is the only justifiable concep-
tion of chance. Any metaphysical or ontological conception is
1
Hegel, FOR, para. 117 (in Sterrett, EOH, 108).

necessarily, he feels, a false one. Never chance but only
necessity is present in existence. He says,
What really is has its own sufficient grounds for
being just as it is—indeed not only mechanical but
ontological grounds. Behind it as its determinate
stands the whole of connected Being, including the
svstem of its orinciples.
In existence apart from man one can only speak of accident
subjectively, i.e. as accident as far as we are concerned. As
such, accident would simply mean • something which we do not
entirely understand, the grounds of which are not clear to us.
In other words, there is nothing in the natural world undeter-
mined .
Accident never means the opoosite of something caused,
determined or necessitated. Its true meaning is rather the
opposite of something "arrived at, purposed, striven for—and
o
therefore indirectly of what ought to be or what has value."
Throughout, then, accident is a tel eological concept.
Thus accident itself sets another limit on the teleological
activity of ?an. It again shows the limits of 'nan 1 s foresight
and oredestination, his divinity. Accident, according to
Hartmann, accrues purely to man. By this he does not mean,
1Hartmann, ETH, I, 293.
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^For a directly opposing point of view *ee Spaulding, WCC
.
Of chance Spaulding says, "Defining Chance or Contingency as
the absence of both TJ ecessitv and impossibility, I discover
not only that there is Chance throughout Mature, here and there,
but also throughout the whole structure of Reality of which
t
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however, that the concept of accident is unimportant to man.
Just the opposite is the case. "And precisely on that account
it plays so large a role in the practical life of men; for here
all perspectives are teleological
.
M Hartmann goes on to add,
"But ontologi cally it does not exist at all, not even for man.
For ontolo r ically he is just as thoroughly determined as every-
p
thine; else."
As far as- human accident is concerned. Hartmann is most
evidently correct, hut the categorical denial of ontolonical
accident is not so certain. If it could be shown, Hartmann to
the contrary, that another or other teleological agencies are
present in the universe besides man, it is by no means incon-
ceivable that these agencies could exoerience acciaent in much
the same form that man does. Were this "shown to be the case, a
great step in the direction of answering the problems raised
by natural evil might be made. At least the possibility of such
an hypothesis is present. Hartmann' s failure to even consider
this leaves the question still open.
Nature itself is but an instance, and, at that, only a chance
instance. In other words, Nature itself, and all it contains,
is only 'one deal of the cards.' It Is, but it need not be.
It is one possibility out of many, but there is no necessity
why this particular possibility should be reali zed" ( vi i ) .
1
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CHAPTER III
RELATIONS OF THE CAUSAL NEXUS AND THE FINALISTIC NEXUS
1. The Categorical Laws of Dependence.
As stresses in the first chapter, the moving force or
power of the causal nexus is a power that works from behind,
"inheres in what has preceded." As such the causal nexus is
indifferent to what results; its power appears as a mechanical
propulsion or "blind necessity. The causal nexus never stops;
things are always determined in terms of antecedent and conse-
quent. But if this is the case we may ask how it is that the
finalistic nexus can be Imposed into the causal nexus at all,
that ends can be worked towards? Hartmann phrases this question
as follows: "What exactly gave to the causal nexus the capacity
to take up heterogeneous determinants into its texture?" He
maintains that it is the very blindness and indifference to
results of the causal nexus which makes this possible.
At everv stacre of the causal nexus one finds a totality of
determinants sufficient to keep the orocess ever going on, and
indeed a totality which permits no indeterminism . However, the
totality is not closed just because it allows no indeterminism.
The totality may very easily and often does accent added deter-
minations from without its own blind course. The "incoming
1
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plus of determination" is simply one more factor in the
determination of the results of the process. The onlv proof of
this statement necessary is that the causal nexus can be con-
trolled in our own experience. The later stages of the causal
nexus are positively determined "by the nexus only in so far as
no new determinants are added. But the addition of one new
determinant will modify the entire complex and all its
following states. The causal nexus has no power to block the
new determinant or to force the process back in its original
direction because it has no goals towards which it is working.
On the other hand the finalistic nexus is by no means made
up of a blind and indifferent efficacy. In the third step,
where the determination is imposed on the causal nexus, the
moving force or power is ahead, is pulling the process towards
the desired results. The power is more a power of attraction
with the end acting on the capacity of"the masmet of the nexus
2
f inal is . " A necessity is involved but not a blind one, rather
a necessity bound by its nature to the pre-established end.
Accordingly, if the end is to be reached it is necessary that
no intervention from without occur. Thus an attempt is made
to cancel every diversion, otherwise the diversion will cancel
the train of the finalistic nexus itself.
Empirically both types of determination can be observed
at work and both are necessary. When either causal or finalistic
Hartmann, ETF, III, 71.
"Ibid.
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determination is taken in an absolute sense, i.e. "when monisti-
cally applied to the whole cosmic structure"^" an abstraction is
perpetrated. Hartmann feels that the same kind of blunder la
committed in case either Is taken alone though in the opposite
direction. Either one reduces the world to a uniformity re-
sulting in a type of relational simplicity of dependence which
blocks out the possibility of freedom. Causal determination
alone would degrade man to the position of a "mere natural
entity" while, he feels, finalistic determination alone in
making nature directed towards ends would raise it to the level
of man himself, again reducing everything to a common denominator.
The latter, he thinks, would "nullify the uniqueness of Moral
Being. Thus in either case the mistake is not in the fact of
determination itself but in a monism of determination.
-.Ye can assert then that there are at least two types of
determination in the universe. The question arises as to exactly
what the nature of their relationship is. Since the finalistic
nexus seems to depend for its completion in the third stage
upon the activity of the causal nexus we can assume that there
is a relation o^ dependence between the two types. Hartmann
<^oes on to maintain that because of the fundamental nature of
the determinisms they most definitely have the character of
categorical structures. Since one of the types is "superimposed,"
to use Hartmann 1 s term, upon the other, a definite stratification
Hartmann, ETH, ITT, 75.
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results, which stratification in turn implies a dependent
relationship. Hartmann feels that in the nature of the de-
pendence we can discover the exact relationship between the
two
.
Accordingly, Hartmann invokes what he calls the "cate-
gorical laws of dependence."''" There are three of these: the
first is the law of strength, the "basic lav/ of the categories.
The other two are really corollaries of the first, "although
in comparison with it thev have a content of their own.'
These two he calls the law of material and the law of freedom.
The categorical laws of dependence may he stated as
follows
:
1. The law of strength: the higher type of determi-
nation is dependent upon the lower, hut the reverse
is not true. Hence the higher is at the same time
the more conditioned and in this sense the weaker.
The loTif on the other hand, is the more elemental,
^
the more fundamental, and in this sense the stronger.
"ftiile he grants that the inversion of this relation is abstractly
quite conceivable, yet he insists that it. can never be demon-
strated empirically from determinati onal types.
1
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Ibid., Ill, 76, also found in II, 447, as follows: "1. The
law of strength: higher principles are dependent upon the lower,
but the converse is not true. Hence the higher principle is
always the more conditioned, the more dependent and in this
sense the weaker. r'ut the more unconditioned, the more ele-
mentary and in this sense the stronger principle is always the
lower one."
I
The second law is as follows:
2. The lav; of material: every lower type is for the
higher one which is raised upon it, merely .material.
Now as the lower is the stronger, the dependence of
the weaker upon the stronger type of determination
extends only so far as the scope of the higher form is
limited the determinateness and peculiarity of
material
.
The third lav/ is stated as follows:
3. The law of freedom: every higher type, as compared
with a lower is entirely a new structure, which (as a
categorical novelty) is raised upon the lower. As such
it has unlimited scope over and above the lower (the
material and stronger ) determinateness . That is,
despite its dependence upon the lower type of deter-
mination, the higher is free, as over against the
1 ower
.
Hartmaiin feels that the most common ail stake "both in the
field of value relationships and in the field o ieterminational
relationships is the inversion of this basic categorical law.
The lower is always the simpler and this very simplicity gives
it its strength. In the realm of values as a] so in the realm
of determinations, the lower and simpler principles reappear
again and again in the higher as "building stones or material
of the higher. But the higher cannot ever annul or fundamentally
Hartmann, ETH, III, 76, also II, 447, as follows: "2. The
law of material: every lower principle is only raw material for
the higher which is raised upon it. Now since the lower is the
stronger, the dependence of the weaker upon it goes only so far
as the scope of the higher formation is limited by the definite-
ness and peculiarit""- of the material."
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change t^e lower, for the lower always has a larger range
of validity and remains binding upon the higher in the new
continuation. The higher law is unable to change the validity
of the lower but can only use the lower as it is unconditionally.
The law of strength, however, is not the only law nor does
it have control over the entire situation. It is limited and
controlled to a certain extent b Tr the laws of material and
freedom. Hartmann says,
They restrict it. Their purport is that, in the scale
of structures, superior strength extends only to the
sphere of the lower Principles as factors within the
more complex forms, that it means only complete fulfil-
ment and indestructibility of the lower, but not
domination. Hence the autonomy of the higher is not
infringed, by the material upon which it depends.
Hartmann contends- that the finalistic nexus is reallv not causal
at all but that it presupposes the "universal validity of the
law of cause and effect" upon which it is utterly dependent
for its existence. let the finalistic nexus qua finalistic
nexus is independent and free in regard to the "stronger"
causal nexus, i.e. it is not dictated to by the causal nexus.
The causal nexus is most evidently lower than the fina-
listic .nexus as evidence((by a number of things. In the first
olace the causal nexus is a much simpler type of determination.
The relative complexity of the finalistic nexus has been shown
by its t^ree stages, analysed in the first chapter, as against
the one sta^e of the causal nexus. In the second place the
finalistic nexus is a much richer, more intensive, and a more
1
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self-contained kind of determination. It contains its own
worth or purpose or ends in itself. In the third place the
finalistic nexus can not be diverted without being destroyed.
Harttnaan maintains that it is a closed system that cannot he
enlarged
.
On the other hand the causal nexus is by no paeans so ex-
clusive. It is far laxer In that it will admit any further
kind of determinants at any atage. It is a "merely universal
determination, which, indeed holds absolutely fast to what it
actually determines, but in so doing is not bound to any pre-
2destined results." ^eing t'^e lower the causal process is the
more fundamental and thus the stronger. Its strength is indi-
cated by the fact that within the final istic nexus the third
stage takes the causal form. In every actualization of an end
the means function as causes while the end takes its form as
an effect. Hartmann insists that all finalistic action and
active volition would be impossible if the world were not
causally determined throughout . If this were not true it would
be impossible to find a given means for any given end. Even
the second stage of the finalistic nexus would be eliminated
as there would be no means to pick from since the selection
of means is a selection of causes. The more fixed and absolute
the causal nexus is, the more readily and certainly the
^-Hartmann, eth, III, 77.
2
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finalistic nexus is able to be effective. Hartmann points
out, "A finalistic nexus floating in the air without a causal
basis is an empty abstraction, a cat egorical impossibility
.
M
Just as the strength of the causal nexus is dependent upon
the first categorical lav/ of dependence, so the scooe of the
finalistic nexus is dependent uoon the law of freedom. The
causal nexus, while a necessary condition is no more than the
material condition of the finalistic nexus. Hartmann specifi-
cally says, "A purposive relation as such can never be brought
o
forth from it." The causal trend as such is never a conscious
trend and thus never knows anv connection with the goals which
are imposed uoon it. The attractive power of the -?oal simply
acts as a new determinant along with the rest of the causal
determinants. The purposive agent may always use the causal
nexus as means in so far as he knows how to do this.
Looking at t^e situation our el y from the point of view of
the finalistic nexus, everything in the causal nexus appears
as accidental, uncaused, or contingent. Of course from the
causal point of view this is not true, for everything is either
cause or effect or both, and it is absolutely necessary that
what hapoens haroens in the wa^ it d©es a v:d could not hapoen
in another way unless other factors are added. Yet what happens
is unpredetermined happening in the sense that it is not
1
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working towards ends and thus is teleolo^ically contingent.
Inherent in this teleological contingency is the cate-
gorical freedom of the final istic nexus. This contingency is
in turn finalistic indet erminism , i.e. the causally determined
in itself is still t eleologically undetermined. Hartmann
explains, "And this simply means that a world under laws of
nature that are merely formed causally stands open to the setting
up of ends and to the purposive activity of any being capable
of foresight and predetermination.""'"
Is Hartmann 1 s basic law of the categories correct, i.e.
is the lower principle actually the stronger and independent
of the higher 0 This is by no means so c-itegori callv certain as
Hartmann seems to think. Hartmann himself seems to contradict
the independence of the lower. Thile he asserts that the
higher "is dependent upon the lower, but the reverse is not
true," yet in the thirdi.law, that of freedom, he asserts that
the higher law has "unlimited scope over and above the lower;"
furthermore the second law asserts that the higher principle
uses the lower as its material and its only limit in regard to
the material is the peculiarity of the material. V/hat this
actually means is that the higher may use the lower in any
manner it so desires, for any "ournose the agent of the higher
mav set up so long as it does not attempt to do something with
the lower which is eomoletelv foreign to the nature of the
1
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lower. As an example a man may use a brick to build a house,
to make a walk, to hold back a door, and for many other
purposes, but he can not use a brick as a constituent or vanilla
ice cream since bricks qua bricks cannot be eaten by man.
Recognizing this to be a crude illustration, yet it seems to
make a number of things clear.
In the first place we would have to agree with Hartmann
that the lower, i.e. the bricks, is more elemental and simple
than the higher, i.e. the man. The man most certainly is more
complex than the brick. Second, we would a-rree that the brick
serves as material for the man. Third, we would agree that,
the man is free to use the brick as he pleases. But we must
insist that for this very reason the man is stronger than and
more independent than the brick. He is stronger in that the
brick is subject to his use and direction. To be sure, the
brick may be stubborn, so to speak, in that it is impossible
to do what cannot be done with it, but this by no means makes
it stronger than the man, bat simply means the man must respect
the material with which he works in using his superior strength
upon it. To sav that the man uses the brick for his own
purposes, changes its oosition, etc., at will and yet that the
brie'" is stronger than the man seems incoherent to sav the
least and almost directly contradictory.
The same incoherence follows in considering the so-called
independence of tbe lower. The lower is dependent on the
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higher for its very meaning. It is only in so far as a teleo-
logical agent views mechanism that any one or thing can be
aware of the existence of the mechanism. It is only in so far
as the teleological agent uses the causal nexus that the causal
nexus becomes intelligible, let alone serves any purpose or ex-
hibits law. At least we can assert that the causal nexus is neb
independent in so far as it is used by a finalistic agent, if
dependence and independence have any meaning, and that its in-
dependence apart from such use, if there be such, is unimportant
and makes no difference to the relationship between the final-
istic nexus and the causal nexus.
It might be pointed out that this argument is entirely from
a teleological point of view and tends to deny the existence of
the causal nexus altogether. But is th*s true? ICe have not
denied the existence of the causal nexus in any sense of the
word.. In fact , human teleology would be impossible without
mechanism. Yet, we are teleological beings, as Hartmann would
admit. All we can use as datum is our experience. We exper-
ience a superior strength over the causal nexus in so far as
we realize a single end that, we set up. All we are contending
is that on the basis of experience and of Hartmann 1 s second and
third categorical laws, of dependence, the basic lav/ of strength
cannot be true if he or we are to be coherent.
Kartmann applies the same categorical laws of dependence
to the field of value relationships. In the field of ethics
superior strength and independence of the lower values would

deny the "basic fact of coaleacence of value"*" and inter-
2penetration of value as much as would the conflict of true
value pointed out in the last chapter. lino points out the i
consistency as follows:
Hartraann's view that the higher principles are
dependent upon the lower but that the converse is
not true overlooks the fact that all intrinsic values
interpenetrate and coalesce .... Values are not
arranged in a scale or series but they constitute a
svste^, so that each value includes all the others,
higher as well as lower.
lino also points out that the onlv wav in which the law of
strength could consistently be held would be to vie?/ it from
an Hegelian point of view as aufeehoben or transcended, i.e.
4died and risen again in the law of ireedom.
Is it possible then to formulate a coherent law of the
relation between higher and lower? As just pointed out, Hege
found such a principle in the nature of dialectic itself, i.e
the principle of transcendency. He expresses this as follows
To transcend ( aufheben ) has this double meaning,
that it signifies to keep or to oreserve and also to
make to cease, to finish. To preserve includes this
negative element, that something is removed from its
immediacy and therefore from a Determinate ^eing ex-
oosed to external influences, in order that it may be
preserved . --Thus , what is transcended is also pre-
served; it has onlv lost its immediacy and is not on
that account annihilated."
1
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According to such a view as this the causal nexus as something
Immediate, blind, and self-existent would be transcended into
the finalistic nexus wh^re it would exist as purposive, crowing,
and meaningful . Thus the lower becomes subordinate to the
higher and works for the fulfilment of the higher as an immanent
part of the higher.
Brishtman sets forth a similar principle first in connec-
tion with higher and. lower values when discussing the higher
intrinsic values as follows: "T^.is group is called the 'higher'
because its values are broader, more inclusive of experience as
a whole, more independent, and more coherent.""*" In turn the
lower are more partial, "include a smaller area of value ex-
perience, and are more dependent on the other values for their
own worth." This same basis of relation would hold, true of
anv grouping of higher and lower, not just that of value
relationships. Brightman sets forth the same hypothesis in
dealing directly with the relation of the causal nexus to the
finalistic nexus as follows: ""echanism is always and everywhere
subordinate to Purpose. This is another wav of savin? that the
lower, tfche beginnings, the elements, find their explanation in
the higher, the consummations, the wholes. The increasing
"orcbabilitv of this point of view will become more evident as
we proceed.
1
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Hartmann would object to this on 8till another basis.
ITartmann maintains that the finalistic nexus must be perfectly
rigid in order that the end may be reached. Any diversion of
the nexus will destroy the end. Ke says,
The finalistic nexus at the same time sees in anti-
cipation. This is why it cannot allow an intervention
'from outside' to occur; it offers resistence to such
an occurrence . at any price; it cancels every diversion.
A power of attraction continues to be bound to the
attractive point, when it is once present to the mind.
In it the goal stands fixed beforehand. In spite of
every diversion it always leads the process back
again to itself, as the point in view.
While it is evident that any strong intersection of cross
purposes is more than likely to cancel out at least one of
them, yet it is by no means so evident that the process is so
inflexible. It is quite possible to hold certain general
purposes in mini towards which one continually works but which
purposes themselves are growing and expanding. This is a
common experience. We tend to work towards our ideals of
oersonality, but as we grow and expand the ideal grows, expands,
changes without being destroyed.
Bergs on thinks that it is mechanism on the other hand which
is inflexible and rigid. Unlike teleology it is always
definite, 'liven certain cases, certain effects alwavs result.
He says, "Yet finalism is not, like mechanism, a doctrine with
fixed rigid outlines. It admits of 8,s many inflections as we
like." Thus Hartmann 's objection that a universe in wMch the
Hartmann, ETH
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causal nexus is subordinated to the finalistie nexus would be
too inflexible and rigid does not seem well founded. Empirical
evidence is against the idea that the finalistic nexus forms
a closed system that cannot be enlarged.
Haromann seems to think of natural and causal law as self-
forming. If the laws of nature "are merely formed causally
,
then regularity and rational natures un explainable . If this
were the case they would simply be the result of blind chance,
contingency of happenings. If the causal nexus can be directed
by the mere adding of new determinants or the imposition of
p
single new elements it is hard to understand how any natural
law is maintained. The laws would be continually shifting
after every happening because new elements would be brought
into play. This would be the wildest sort of indeterminism in
which we could not count on the dependability of any natural
law as persisting. This situation could be remedied only by
one of two hypotheses: Either the causal nexus would have to
become rigid allowing no new determinants and thus completely
cancelling all forms of teleology including human teleology or
else the laws of nature would have to be the expression of
rational purpose in some form using the causal nexus as its
material. Hartmann rejects both of these.
Hartmann, ETH, III, SO.
2
Ibid., 70. A newly arriving determinant within a complex
of determinants already at hand means that the process is
diverted.
"
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2. The Mistakes of Causal Monism.
Hartmann's criticism of mechanism is made almost entirely
from the point of* vie?/ of his categorical laws of dependence.
Causal monism maintains and preserves the "basic categorical
law, i.e. the law of strength, unconditionally, "but in so
doing violates the two higher laws of material and of freedom.
"The superiority of the causal nexus as regards 'strength' is
carried to t v e extreme and is assigned absolute dominion." 1
The goals of the finalistic nexus are destroyed are subverted
as mere unforeseen points in the causal order.
In causal monism cauoality is by no means regarded
merely as the material of purposive actualization, but
also as the concrete determinant, or at least as that
which in the fluctuations of human fancy selects the
possible ends.
Man becomes a mere automaton.
Those who hold to a mechanistic interpretation of the uni-
verse fail to take into account the fact that man is able to
choose ideals and work towards their realization. It destroys
the autonomy of values (or ideals) themselves and reduces them
to mere feelings within us that make no difference one way or
the other.
The law of freedom is utterly disregarded. The mechanist
fails to recognize the contingency of the causal nexus in
1
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relation to the finallstle nexus. The lower is lifted to the
place of the higher while the higher not, only "becomes unfree
hut is destro^red.
This constitutes Hartmann 1 s rejection of mechanism. The
rejection is based entirely upon an analysis in light of his
categorical laws of dependence. It is rather doubtful if any
mechanist would be much perturbed by this rejection alone.
Hartmann fails to grapple with the real problems involved in a
mechanistic point of view, and the reasons for this failure
are evident. Too much of Hartmann 1 s own system depends on the
ontological validity of the mechanistic claims at least as
regarding the world other than man. Hartmann 1 s claim that
onlv man is a teleological beinp; leaves the rest of the world
not t eleoloc-icall y determined and thus to the realm of causality.
As we shall see later he actually imposes many types of deter-
mination between the ^urelv causal and the purely teleological
and still other types below the causal but none of these other
types can he purposive except teleological determinism, by
definition. Consequently the rest of the v/orld being non-
purposive is impersonal.
First we must ask what constitutes the nature of this
non-personal, non-teleolo<*ical realm of being? If it has a
substantive nature it is necessary to ask what the substance is,
what it does, how we are to know of its existence, how we are
to explain the fact of change? Certainly the mechanist would

have to admit that apparent mutter has no real existence since
it can be analyzed into simpler elements. rut these simpler
elements cannot he understood apart from their activities since
,/e have no knowledge of their existence apart from these
activities. As Bowne points out,
Things as existing do not have the distinction of
substance and attribute which they have in our thought.
They do not consist of subjects to which predicates
are externally attached, a° if they might exist
apart from the predicates, but thev exist only in
the predicates.
Accordingly the being and the activity of things are inseparable.
Furthermore, power cr activity is only known or experienced as
the power or activity of some a^ent. Again from Bowne,
Reality is always an agent." Thus the burden of proof of
the existence of materialistic, "lumrish" world is with the
holder of such a view. We can assert with Bowne that "things
exist only in their activities, and have no being apart from
them. They are, in brief, concreted formulas of action. 1,3
If this is true, how can we assert the existence of a causal
world at all unless it is the activity of a conscious purposing
agent? Assuming that non-conscious active agents are possible,
the blind activity of such agents would necessarily be lawless
,
unguided flux or flow in which the causal laws of nature would
1
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be the result of utterlv mysterious chance combination of the
agents, subject to disruption at an- time*
put assuming the aechanlstlc view of a dominant causal
nexus of antecedence and seouence without any more basic ground
we discover new difficulties. To be sure, in Hartmann' s causal
nexus there is a fixity of law, but this law is itself "ca-usally
formed1' thus arising out of the flow itself and grounded in
it. This would seem to be saving that basically the only relation
between past and future is that of antecedence and sequence.
Bowne points out the result of such a view as follows:
This view would reduce everything to an absolute and
groundless becoming. In that case, the present would
not be founled in the oast, and wo "Id not found the
future. All continuity would be dissolved, and every
phenomenon would be a groundless and opaque fact.
Mechanists in general attempt to rescue themselves from this
difficulty as Hartmann does by postulating the reality of
mathematical and rational determinations within the causal
order. But in so doing they are postulating the very rational
principles discovered, used, and applied by man, a teleological
bein-T, which are manifestations of his intelligence and which
when found elsewh-re would tend to suggest intelligence as
their author.
Overlooking these more basic questions, let us assume for
Hartmann, ETH, III, 80.
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a moment the existence of things apart from creative intelli-
gence and arrain ask ho?; causation is possible? How can a cause
have an effect or how can. interaction bet?;een independent ob-
jects be explained 1? If one thinks of the action itself being
passed from one object to another the fatal objection is raised
that attributes, conditions, and states as such cannot be
passed along since they are meaningless apart from their sub-
jects. One man walks and another man walks, but walking as .
such cannot be passed from the first man to the second, lowne
expresses this by savins, "A condition cannot be transmitted
or transferred, because the notion of a state or condition
without a subject is impossible in thought.""'" If the mechanist
thinks of the transference as a. transference of influence
and by influence does not mean an attribute but a thing, he
raises another series of unanswerable questions. In order to
be convincing he must explain,
(l) What the thing is which passes; (2) in what this
passing thing differs from the things "between which it
passes; (3) what the relation of the passing thing is
to the thing from which it passes; (4) where the
acting thing gets the store of things which it emits;
and (5) how the passing thing could do no ^ore than
the original thing from which it proceeds.
The use of the word force instead of influence fails to change
the problem. Thus the causal nexus breaks down of its own
weight when asserted as t v e only or self-sufficient means of
MET
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causality. Active conscious intelligence would appear to be the
onlv possible "basis of a causal nexus.
Bowne sums up the difficulties of an impersonal causal
world and the most probable solution to the3o difficulties as
follows
:
Interaction between the many must be replaced by imma-
nent action of the one. Impersonal causality vanishes
hopelessly in the Heraclitean flux. The impersonal
itself falls asunder into a plurality either in space
or time, and we seek in vain for any substantial bond.
Living, active intelligence is the condition both of
conceptual and metaphysical unity. Volitional causality,
that is, intelligence itself in act, is the only con-
ception of metaphysical causality in which we can rest.
The most cogent argument Hart nann brings against causal
monism is that it fails to take into account the fact that man is
able to choose values and act towards their realization. Actually
the -jord value itself would be a meaningless term in a mecha-
nistic universe. ethics would be non-existent^ since freedom,
responsibility, guilt, and choice would be eliminated.
Even knowledge would be impossible in a mechanistic universe.
Hechanism cannot assume purpose or end in any form, even thought,
as present. Put as Br": ghtman points out, "If it is to expound
and defend its own position, it must recognize the purpose to
o
think truly and must believe that this purpose can be attained."
In a universal mechanise everything must be an outcome of what
has preceded. However this everything would include all knowledge
1
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and thought as well as other action. Thus mechanist s are
placed in a peculiar contradiction
.
If mechanism "be true, it is equally necessary for some
to "believe in mechanism and others in teleology; and
equally futile for either party to appeal to reason;
for the appeal to reason is an appeal from what is in
the mind at present to an ideal of logical truth. The
mechanistic philosophy makes any such appeal to ideals
or ends as ultimate principles logically impossible.
Thus mechanism fails to take into account at least two
whole realms of experience, i.e. value and knowledge, not to
mention our conscious experience of working towards ends. We
can truly assert that mechanism is a philosophy of abstraction.
Finally anv theory that sets up a causal nexus not grounded
in anything else or basic to everything else has set up an in-
finite repress. Everything in the present causal state is
dependent on an equal number of things in the past which is de-
pendent on an equal number of things before that on ad infinitum .
Thus there could be no ultimate source of energy or appearance
of novelty. This s°ems unsatisfactory, to say the least.
There can be no immanent creativity or organic unity within
the flux. An infinite regress violates , the principle of coherent
synopsis. "Truth is a coherent synopsis, a view of reality as
2
a whole. In the infinite regress there is no whole."
Considering the combined arguments presented above which
beset causal monism, it is faced with insurmountable obstacles.
Brightinsn, Im?, 266.
Ibid., 268.

iTe can thus consider it as an Insufficient account of deter-
mination 0.! peal.ity. Hartmann would agree with the latter
statement, tut he could not agree with all of the reasons set
forth. The reason will becom^ more evident. These added
points have "been taken into consideration "because some of
them will apply to Hartmann 's own system in so far as he tends
to think of the world other than man himself as non-teleo-
logical
.
3. The Mistakes of vinalistic monism.
The ma.ior tendency in the history of philosophy has been
to consider puroose as a, if not the, basic universal and onto-
lo-ical cate^rv, to consider purpose as fundamental in ex-
plaining reality. Hartmann feels that this tendency is a re-
version to myth and animism.
Herein they ^philosophers/ have followed mythical
thought, which sees in every striking phenomenon of
nature the working of puroosive powers
,
and, then,
cannot abstain from interpret ing the whole of
nature, according to the analogy of one's own per-
sonality as animated, as foreseeing and striving.
The reason for this mythical train of thought is probably to
be found in the fact that man earlv recognized the failure of
causal explanation alone when it comes to living matter.
These philosophers were probably correct in asserting
that a different kind, a higher tvoe of determination sets in
in the biological realm of existence. However the assumption
1
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that this hi r-' er type of determination is purposive, finalistic,
Hartmann feels to be unwarranted. ;Ve only meet or actually
experience the finalistic nexus in willing and active con-
sciousness and it seems purely arbitrary to assume that it
pervades the whole of metaphysics. These philosophers only
knew of two types of determinism and finding the first type
invalid turned to finalism without considering that there might
he many more t^ rpes of determinism which as yet were unknown.
In connection with the inorganic world of nature, teleo-
logy was criticized, found wanting, and discarded with the in-
ception of modern science and the acceptance of Newtonian
physics. Hartmann thinks Kant continued the trend by ade-
quately showing the untenability of a teleological view for
the organic world. Kant says in the Crit ique of Judgment when
pointing out the possibility of a mechanistic concept of an
evolution
.
And so the whole technic of nature, which is so in-
comprehensible to us in organized beings that we
believe ourselves compelled to think a different prin-
ciple for it, seems to be derived from matter and its
powers according to mechanical laws (like those by
which it works in the formation of crystals)
.
Hartmann thinks, however, that a thorough criticism of
cosmic teleolocrv has not vet been made. The reason for this
is bound up in his ilea that "the theory is too far removed
2from the phenomena to have a firm foothold anywhere
.
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There have been those, however, who have attempted such
a task. In this country Sidney Hook is an example of a
philoso her from a naturalistic group who has undertaken the
job. Hook says,
'"'here discursive analysis is permitted, it seems to
me that the two key concepts are teleology and proba-
bility. To a naturalist, evidence for purpose, needs,
organization, and ends in nature is discovered in the
behavior of sp ecific things and organisms. No reference
to the purpose of the whole is empirically relevant to
the purposes he discovers by natural observation and
experiment. And logically . no inference to the existence
of such a purpose is permissible until it is first
_
shown that the cosmos has the same structure of ^sic/
the finite things which are the locus of the purposes
already discovered. But since the cosmos is declared
to be unlimited in space and time, the naturalist
denies both the existence of such a purpose and the
rationality of its quest. The concept of probability
is crucial to the only argument for the divine existence
of Pod which is still, recognized as having force--the
argument from design.
Hartmann would go on to add that we do not need to give cosmic
teleology ve~y serious thought anyway since, "In general meta-
physics, teleology has only the character of fiction and is not
p
to bo taken seriously by philosophical science."*"
Hartmann is perfectly willing to admit that there are nany
na f ural structures which show a remarkable adaptation tor t-he
existence of other structures as a central feature of their
make-up. In such cases the natural structures certainl^
function "as if" they were constructed for a definite purpose.
This "as if" as sue'" is not an arbitrary point of view. We
Art. (1934) , 241-242.
!
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h&tt a perfect rirht to talk about the "as if" as well as of
the phenomenon of adaptation which can "be observed, but from
these we have no right to infer "the actual presence of
purpose or of origination due to purposive activity."^ The
assigning of purposive activity to phenomena because of this
adaptation is a purely arbitrary action on the part of human
thought. It is possible thus arbitrarily to assign purpose to
nature because the causal nexus can be so interpreted without
self-contradiction. Nature only exhibits the causa] nexus at
work, but since in the case of human teleology the third stare
of the teleolo^ical act is carried out by the causal nexus man
has a proclivity also to assign the other two stares of the
final istic nexus to nature. Nature car. not oppose this im-
position so long as it does not actually contradict the facts,
but no -roof of the existence of the earlier stages of the
finalistic nexus as present can be adduced. If there were no
positive reasons gainst such a position it would remain at
best a mere "as if."
Hartmann thinks there are t v ree basic reasons why man
tends to fall into a " teleolorical falsification" of the
cosmos. First, the tremendous ccmplexitv of ontological deter-
mination makes it easy to think that only an/intelligenee could
be so complex, -/hen actually the means o^ determination tend
to be inaccessable to our understanding. The second reason
1
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follows from the first. Purpose as a principle of explanation
easily deludes us into thinking we understand when actually the
situation is so intricate we are unable to grasp it. It is the
old fallacy of "believing "in the s i :nol ex s 1 1 lum v er
i
.
"
Evidently Hartmann things Occam's razor is toe dull and needs to
be discarded. Third, as pointed out above, by analogy we tend
to extend the idea of conscious purposive activitv to "merely
accidental adaptation to an end." Hartmann ^ives as an added
reason the fact that man seems to have a natural tendency to
subordinate the ontolcgical to the axiological point of view
and thus to think of the world oroces? as such as working
towards the actualization of the valuable. Hartmann considers
such a view untenable since he feels that only man can work
consciously for the achievement of ends. Thus bv a -rand
analogy we fashion the world after ourselves and in so doing
transcend all limits of reasoning.
What is the result? Theism emerges. This, Hartmann
thinks, is the one conception above all others that cannot be
justified. He says,
But the consequence is, that one tacitly acdepts what
no human thought can justify : a consciousness which
sets up ends, foresees and preordains and is in
control o^ the real ecu idan.ee of the process, an active
subject , a personal entity on a large scale. Tf the
world be a purposive activity, 'someone* must stand
behind it who is purposively active within it. Teleo-
logieal metaphysics mu3t inevitably lead up to a per-
sonal creator—that is, to that one assumption which
"""Hartmann, ETH, I, 285.
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more than any other is beyond all verification.
Such a 3-od, Hartmann thinks, represents anthropomorphism
in the extreme. He turns out to be "a faithful copy of man,
2
only raise! to the absolute." Man s foresight and predeter-
mination are raised to an infinite degree. The idea of 3-od is
simply an extreme psychological projection of man. This base
anthropomorphism is present even if _1od be taken not as a
person but as unconscious cosmic ends. For this impersonal
Grod is simply the hypostat izati on of human idea-Is, values, or
ends left floating in air without support
.
Thus Hartmann uses as his first major argument against
finalistic monism or the existence of od the charge of anthro-
pomorphism. Hartmann then proceeds to his second major argument
based on his categorical laws of dependence.
Hartmann rightly sees that any teleological view of the
universe rests on a primacy of the axiologloal categories over
the ontological ones. It rests on a supremacy of the 11Ought
-
to-Be" over the existent as such. But, Hartmann thinks, this
unfortunately means that the lower, simpler, and "stronger"
categories are made dependent upon the higher, more complex and
specific categories* Accordingly, this means an inversion of
the basic categorical law, the law of strength*. It denies the
relative weakness of the higher categories. Here the causal
Hartmann, STH, I, 28^-286.
2Ibid.
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nexus is made dependent upon the final*. stic when rightly the
causal nexus is the presupposition of the final! stic nexus as
he attempted to show in his analysis of the categorical laws
of dependence.
In the finalistic monism the law of freedom is retained
hut is magnified beyond all proportion. Hartmann recognizes,
however, that a finalistic monism ioes not do away with the
causal nexus altogether. The causal nexus is retained and
categorical dependence persists but only immanently within the
finalistic nexus. No causal occurrences are left free and un-
guided in the universe. Behind every causal occurrence stands
the two other steps of the finalistic nexus. As Hartmann
points cut, "The causal process is not itself suspended; hut it
has ceased to be a proceso that runs on in blind indifference."
A boundless freedom is granted to the finalistic nexus. It
becomes absolutely superior and dominates the causal nexus
from beginning to end.
Hartmann rightly thinks that th A s question of categorical
relation is the crux of the matter. If his categorical laws of
dependence were true, then the causal nexus could very easily
and would exist without deference to purposive action. The
causal nexus would exist by itself and a finalistic imposition
would simply be the adding of a new determinant in particular
instances. He a" so correctly points out,
"""Hartmann, ETH, III, 82.
4
But then, for the manifestation of a finaliatic bond
in the course of the world, there is need at once of
a being which has the c: tegoric:- 1 potentiality to
achieve the end. Only a foreseeing value-sensing
entity, capable of intention and purposive energy, is
of this kind.
However, he argues, this is an impossible violation of the cate-
gorical ] aws of dependence.
This entire notion that the lower depends on the higher
is at bottom a teleolo~ical prejudice; as a univeraal
formula., it would read: lower structures are always
dependent upon higher ones as ends, for the sake of
which they exist and in which alone tbe^ find siani-
f icance.
The third major argument Hartmann brings against a finalisti
monism is based on the nature of the finalir:tic nexus itself.
Because of the categorical inversion involved finalistic
neutrality or the finalistic contingency of the causal nexus
is destroved and the ever possible "divertability" of the
causal nexus to finalistic ends is made impossible. The world
is changed from a controlable, changeable process to a ri<?idlv
determined .whole in" which everv process down to its s mallest
particular is made undivertable. A nature like 'man structurall''
would be like him teleolo--i ea] lv and axi©logically, and there
would be nothing for man to guide or control. He could find
no means for his ends since all means would be emploved bv the
cosmic teleological -gene v.
When a new determinant appears within a complex of already
Hartmann, ETH, III, 83.
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existing determinants the process is changed or diverted and
moving in another direction does not arrive at the same point
it would have had the new determinant not been added. If the
process were originally teleologi cal and a new determinant is
added, it can onlv mean the destruction of the original process
and the missing of its ends. A teleolo?ical process, to "be
successful, cannot incorporate new factors, according to
Hartmann. Its system "is a closed totality which resists any
addition. 4 Onl ,r two possibilities are present when a new
determinant appears: e Ither the new determinant will exert a
superior strength and the original process will be destroyed,
or else the older finalistie trend will be stronger and will
overcome the intruder, cancel the diversion and proceed in its
original direction. No matter which way the process works,
the freedom of the determiner Is destroyed, in the one case
divine, in the other human.
Furthermore, if natural processes are teleological through-
out, then man as a natural product, is throughout determined
by the natural determining agent and any semblance of human
choice or freedom is destroyed, consigned to illusion. Even
if his will is not so determined it can accomplish nothing f or
he is continually subject to the macrocosmic powers of the
universe against which his puny nature la of no avail. :.lan
is forced by his own impotence to let nature take its course.
1
Kartmann, ETH, III, 70.
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Hartmann's final argument, against a teleolo ical universe
•is derived from his third argument. As pointed out above,
a teleological universe tends to set axiologica] determination
above and before ontolcrical determination. Such a teleologi c
determination by values or a valuing agent would mean a
"?erfect" or complete determination in which man is deprived
of any determination of his own. The goals and results of the
process °re fixed and man la simply "e"1 codded in the cosmic
process itself
,
w He finds himself in an unconditional bondage
that he had no part in choosing or setting up. His own sense
of teleology is merely a matter of self delusion and ignorance.
This can only mean the destruction of the ethical nature of
man
.
In a finalistic monism man is automatically and meta-
physically removed from all responsibility, accountability, and
guilt. Conscience and any sense of guilt are pure delusions.
Man may still be a conveyor and even actualizer of certain
limited values. But his actualization and conveyorship are not
of his own choosing; He can not be praised or blamed. He is
simply an instrument, a means, through which the larger
teleolo^ic-l process is carried on. Freedom is gone and with
it moral nature and acts. "As a moral being, as a person, he
2is annihilated, he stands on a level with natural entities.
1
Hartmann, ETK, I, 237.
2 Ibid.
is
Human ethics is destroyed. Only divine ethics persists.
It does not matter whether the teleolo-rical theory is theistic
or pantheistic
; ethics is nullified. All thv.t is left for .nan
is fatalism. Hartmann here adds a very interesting footnote:
That the opposite is continually reasserted by re-
presentatives of such metaphysics ... is a fact which
"betrays their way of thinking. They lack not only
philosophical coherence, hut every trace of serious
categorical analysis.
The finalistic nexus is the peculiar property of man.
Taken away from him and converted into a world principle it
takes away man's birth ri^ht, dispossesses him of his very beinst
as man. The structure of the f inalistic nexus bars any possi-
bilit ir of man's moral freedom under such circumstances. "All
2
ethical phenomena would be phantom-appearances. Man only
becomes possible in a non-teleolo^ical universe. A teleo-
loffAcal universe would be the worst sort of a "tyrannical auto-
cracy, 1 in which man's sensing of values and his every effort
becomes a mockery.
In such a teleolo-i cally determined universe where every
-
thing would be completely decided beforehand any prevision or
knowledge of the future on the part of man would be a positive
evil. Man might be able to see ahead but he could do nothin? to
Hartmann, ETH, I, 283
.
2
Ibi a
.
, 290
.
3
Ibid.
,
II, 85. '
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change his circumstances or the future in any way whatsoever.
Prevision is of value only in a universe man can change, in a
universe determined causally. A causal universe, Hartmann
thinks, allows itself or rather makes possible such change.
In such a universe ^an by the addition of "one ^in^le thread,
in the network of the causal interlacement .. .is in a Position
to transform the whole,""*" and his moral autonomv is preserved.
Otherwise man is butting his head against an unyielding wall.
Hartmann asserts that fortunately ethics can not be so
easilv destroyed. Just calling the world t eleolo-ically deter-
mined does not make it so. Hven the teleolo~ist must com-
promise, and this compromise betray his weakness and also
tends to obscure the facts. In theory teleology sounds plausible,
but "the s\mple fact is that the phenomenon of the moral con-
sciousness of man as a personal being is incompatible with
cosmic teleology." The t eleolo ~ist ' s theory is perfectly self-
cons' stent, but self -consistency alone is no proof of validity.
Only adequate inclusion of empirical phenomena can validate a
theory and teleology as a world theory overlooks this. Thus
Hartmann concludes,
To a fantastic min:l the theory may be of greater im-
portance; to a ohilosopber the Phenomenon is under all
circumstances of ~r eater weight. He must give up
tol ^olocd cal metaphysics in favour of ethical
Hartmann, ETH, IT, 150.
2Ibid., I, 288.
r
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phenomena
.
Before turning to a closer Investigation of Hartmann's
position, let us see? if there is any evidence for other than
human teleology in the world. First of all, the very causal
laws themselves, the laws of nature or natural law needs some
sort of explanation. Hartmann, as pointed out earlier, seems
to think the causal laws are merely causally formed. We
attempted then to show the incons i stency of such a view, the
instabilitv of causal law that would result. These rational,
regular laws of nature would seem to either have to be the ex-
pression o^ energetic purpose or else set, invariable mechanical
rules. From any point of view the idea that these laws simply
arise out of the caus*il nexus itself by chance configuration
is incomprehensible.
If the second view is true, i.e. that trie natural laws
are set mechanical rules, twe things must be considered. In
the first place where did these laws come from? If the answer
is that they have existed eternally then we must ask how is it
possible that they should have such a rational nature as to be
recognized by mind as rational postulates 9 If the answer
should be that mind is a product of the machine run by these
laws or that mind is simply a more advanced mechanism, at
least Hartmann's eosition has become untenable since he holds
that mind is different from the rest of nature, sd different
1
Hartmann, ETF, I, 283.
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that it possesses its own peculiar kind of determination,
.oral action would be as effectively canceled under such a
system as Hartmann thinks it is in a teleologieal world.
But it may he urged that, Hartmann defeated or not,
mechanism may then have won the day. To this it can be ans-
wered that empirically man does initiate activity directed
towards ends as Hartmann so well indicates. Furthermore, if
the mechanistic position were true, everything would necessarily
have to conform, exactly to strict machine laws. That this is
not the case even in inorganic nature is made evident by such
scientific investigation as that of Heisenberg, de 5rog].ie,
Dirac , and others. '.Yerkmeister points out of the physical
world
,
At no time can we sav that reality 'really is 1 as we
conceive it to be in our imagination or as we define
it for the explicit purpose of commuting mathematically
the correct values of its quantitative manifestations.
The history of quantum and wave mechanics speaks
without equivocation on this point.
Then again all the arguments brought against causal monism in
the last section would still apply to the hypothesis of strict
mechanical law.
It seems then much more rational and coherent to con-
sider '"hese laws as the expression of rational purpose in the
universe. Dr. ^rightman sets this idea forth as follows:
The teleolo-ist
,
however, se r ks a .more connected, a
more coherent view of the universe. He sees in the
laws of li?ht and of all forms of energy the expression
"bos, 266.
r
of an eternal rational purpose. Purpose, as we know
by our finite experience, performs the function of
unifyin" ari organizing complex details, whether of
the inner life or of the environment, and making every
detail serve an end.... If we regard the laws of li-rht
nd all laws of matter as manifestations of the ourpose
of a supreme reason, we cannot pretend thereby to have
solved every problem; but we may v/ell maintain th ;.-~i we
have dealt more reasonably, that is, more coherently,
with natural law than has the mechanist.
Second, the s?-called world of matter, is so arranged
that evolution ana the development of life has been possible.
If it had not been for the presence of three elements, carbon
hydrogen, and oxygen, and for the nature of atomic structure
making possible certain definite relationships of these
elements, life, if not impossible, would have been highly
improbable. Somehow the conditions making ths relation of
elements in certain very rational ways possible ca.::e about.
Dr. Lawrence Henderson of Harvard states,
"
T o mechani cal cause whatever is conceivable of those
original conditions, whatever they may be, which
unequivocally determine the changeless properties of
the elements and the general characteristics of
systems alike. We are therefore led to the hypothesis
that the properties of the three elements are somehow
a preparation for the evolutionary process.
The peculiar conditions that make evolution possible consist
a group of characteristics of the chemical world of such a
nature that they can hardly be regarded as ;erely contingent.
Henderson concludes,
IT?, 289-290.
00N, 203.
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Thus, at length, with the help of the scientific
analysis, the result which was ... declared to be nec-
essary for a belief in teleology is attained. For
the t "leolory of nature is recognized through a con-
nection, conceivable only as t eleolo^i cal among
nature's own laws, i.e. amohg the abstract characters
of nature which may be exactly defined.
Next we turn to the field of evolution itself. Fvolution
seems to be a process of development, of appearance of new and
higher forms of life. In the process we find a surprising
evidence of ouroose as shown bv oeculiar adaptations, by the
continual upward surge towards the development, of conscious
individuals. Countless writers have shown evidences of purpose
within the process.
One of the first men to consider the problem comprehen-
sively was the French philosopher, Paul Janet, in his work
c 2 lied Final Causes . Janet pointed out the improbability of
many complicated or^anis and organisms as not frefng the result
of purpose. In connection withttbe eye he says,
To set aside in this case every final cause, we must
admit that while certain physical and blind causes
produced transparent cones, other physical causes,
equally blin", prepared walls fitted to absorb the
light; that some made the cones,, and others the
corresponding facets; that other blind causes brought
both into harmony, forced them to coincide in that
combination— itself so wondrously in harmony with a
final act, agreeing in its turn with the interests of
t v e animal. If so amazing an assemblage of agree-
ments and conveniences can be produced by a simple
coincidence, there is no longer a principle of
causality.
00h), 206.
2
FC, 66.
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Bergson, while opposed to a strictly teleolo-i cal view of the
universe, points out that even in divergent evolutionary stocks
of the animal kingdom such as in both the molluscs and verte-
brates eyes tend to be produced."'" While it is true as Bergson
indicates that the complicated eye Janet describes is the result
p
of a long process of evolution vet the very appearance of the
rudimentary eve itself needs explanation, particularly when it
appears in different branches of the evolutionary tree.
After showing evidence that even after parts of an egg
have been destroyed the animal in question will develop in the
regular way, Werkmelster says,
Now this 'whole' which is given in the first egg cell
cannot be a 'localized mechanism' or a specifically
differentiated 'structure'; for all experiments con-
sidered above show that the primary 'wholeness' of the
egg is 'indestructible' in a sense in which 'mechanisms'
and fixed structures cannot be 'indestructible'. The
'wholeness' of the egg, in other words, is not a mere
'sum of its parts. It is not even an organized
'mosaic'. In the first egg cell we find no preformed
arrangement of specific parts but only the potenti-
alities for such parts
These potentialities would seem to involve purpose.
Every evidence of design in nature is an evidence for
teleology. If we do not assume purpose of some sort we find
ourselves and the world in a very peculiar position. Janet
states this as follows:
Bergson, CS, 87-88.
Ibid., 61.
^Werkmeister, POS, 350.
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fow imagine a blind ani idiotic workman, alone in a
cellar, "/ho simply by moving his limbs to and fro should
be found to have forged a key capable of opening the
most complex lock. If we exclude design, this is what
Nature is supposed to be doing.
There is undoubtedly tremendous waste and cruelty evident in
the evolutionary process and vet it is hard to understand ho?/
any s-:ecies fit to survive ever arrived except on a teleologieal
basis. Survival of the fit takes care of weeding out the un-
desirables, but how any species that could live ever appeared
cannot be explained by the same method. Bright.man says of this
fact of appearance of the new,
If organisms are the product of a power that is capable
of foresight and purpose, the possibility of the
origin of new types of life, related to the old, 3^et
better equipped to survive, and adapted to lead on to
still higher types, becomes less opaque and accidental,
more i "t elligible and rational."
Thus while the waste and cruelty of evolution may point to a
finite or limited -od, the purposeful creation and value in-
volved most evidently point to the existence of some sort of
G-od
.
3
If purpose is not at work in the world of nature the
emergence of a purposive being such as man is unexplainable.
Otherwise man as a purposive bein~ is simply an accident oc-
curring in an utterly different type of universe.
Hook's argument that evidence for teleology can only be
^Quoted from Janet by J.F. Clarke, Art. (1879).
2
Bright:man, ITP, 284.
^-rightman, POR, 315-318.
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found in specific things and organisms and thus cannot be
sec eoted 3eems far from the facts. The '.vhole orocess of nature
from its laws to its products seems to indicate purpose. Only
on a "basis o" specific instances can .an- anti-t eleologlcal
argument ?ain footing. However, in so far as there is one
specific instance that is teleological in nature, that thing
must "be taken into account and at least that much teleology must
be ^ranted. :.Ye are in no danger of having to appeal to one
thin^; rather the entire realm of nature seems to point to the
plausibility if not the necessity from the point of view of
cohersnt explanation of a teleological view. Keeping these
evidences for teleology in mind let us pr meed to investigate
Hartmann's objections more closely.
Hartmann's first major objection to a teleological view
of the universe was that it is too anthropomorphic. How valid
an objection is this? • Unfortunately all human thinking is
thinking done by human beings. Consequently it is all tinged
with a human point of view. In this sense science is as
ci^r t ^nr* ot^ o i** In. i c 3. s el^iv 0"tV^^!r* iDifstncln of t Itou. ceil "t •
Natural science rests on the foundation of human
sensations and human logic; it makes no statements
about objects wv ich are not logical interpretations
of our human sensory experiences. In fact, all
thinking, whether good or bad, must be anthropo-
morphic.
It is necessary, then, to find some oth-r basis of condemnation
than mere anthropomorphism . To be sure, many forms of anthropo-
1Brightman, POR, 329.
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morphlsm are Invalid ways of thinking, but it is not the anthro-
pomorphism that makes them such. We can onl Tr criticize a belief
on the basis of its incoherence, its lack of rati nality, not on
a basis of anthropomorphism unless the anthropomorphism is in-
coherent in nature.
Hartmann quotes Kant as havin^ proved that a tel eological
view of organic nature is invalid. Besides the quotation cited,
Kant, a few pages earlier, sets forth his reason why teleology
cannot be postulated as objectively certain. He says,
But what now in the end does the most complete
Teleolo-y prove? Does it prove that there is such
an intelligent Being? No. It only proves that
according to the constitution of our cognitive
faculties a ;od in the consequent combination of ex-
perience with the highest principles of Reason, we
can form absolutely no concept of possibility/- of such
a world /as this/ save by thinking a lesignedly-
workin?; sunrerne cause thereof. Objectively we cannot
therefore lay down the proposition, there is an
intelligent original Being; but onlv subjectively, for
the use o^ our Jud?ment in its reflection upon the
purposes in nature, which can be thought according to
no other principle £han that of a designing causality
of a highest cause.
Two things must be remembered in regard; to Kant's remarks
on the reality of purpose in the world. In the first place sub-
jective and objective for Kant did not have the same connotations
that they do for more recent "ohilosophy.
For him objectivity was characteristic of the phenom-
enal order as revealed by sense. It did not denote the
metaphysically real. Such truth as might not be com-
prehended under sense perception was subjective. Sub-
jectivity, for Kant, did not carry any implications of
falsity. It was not merely the manipulations of each
Greene, KS, 483-484.
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and everv individual mind. Rather did it derive its
universality, from the very structure of reason and
personality.
I Thus in a sense the subjective was more real to Kant than the
objective since the objective belonged to the world of phenomena
which hid the person from the true world of the noumena behind
them
.
In the second place Kant was not rejecting the idea of a
teleol o^ical lod except in so far as he felt that -od's existence
could not be proved from the evidence of the phenomenal world.
Kant reintroduces 3-od as knowable through the practical reason
p
as a necessary moral postulate. Thus it would seem that
Hartmann is a pealing to the wronc; man for support of his theory.
Hartmann's contention that teleolo-rical explanation is an
over-simolif ication seems rather inconsistent. At the top of
3the same page on which he informs us that teleology falls
under "the old belief in the s implex si milium veri , " he main-
tains that while many events in the causal nexus appear "as if"
they were teleolo<?ically brought about, these events viewed
"critically" must remain a "mere 'as if'" and expects us to
accept this as the true interpretation. If teleology is over-
simplification an "as if" philosopher can hardly afford to make
the charge. Hartmann's continual assertion that teleolosists
P "'"Quotation from Brightman in Philosophy Seminar Minutes , IV
(February 28, 1940), Boston University.
2
^reene, KS, 360-363.
5ETH, I, 235.
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while consistent cannot be coherent seems rather out of
place. It niffht be wise if he became a bit more coherent in
his own thought.
It may be quite true that a good portion of the
teleological argument rests on analogy. But is reasoning by
analogy so mistaken as Hartmann would have us think? Most
'
scientific laws seem to be based ultimately on analogy. The
scientist observes a group of phenomena acting in certain ways
a d then proceeds to formulate a rational law "as if" the
phenomena were behaving according to postulates of reason.
The very regular 4 ^- of these laws is based on the regularity
of thought in observation and certainly not on a phenomenal
Identity presented by the senses alone. The latter does not
exist from any strict point of viev.^ as evidenced by the fact
that sensations are always momentary and fleeting. Certainly
it would seem that a concept with as much evidence in its
favor cannot be cast aside simply because it involves an "as
if." Janet in considering this same objection says,
Remember we have the right to say here, as men of science
do in similar circumstances, that all takes place as
if the course of these phenomena had foreseen the effect
which they behaved to produce: would it not be strange
that a blind cause should act in precisely the same
manner as one not blind would do? Consequently, until
it be proved that such facts have not been fores -en,
the presumption is that thev have been. It lies with
those who deny it to furnish the contrary proof:
TT e^anti in cumb it probatio
.
Hartmann, ETH, I, 288.
2Janet, FC, 78.
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If the hypothesis were accepted simply in lack of positive
disproof, it could hardly he claimed as necessarily valid on
that account, Borne to the contrary,^ hut that is hardly the
case with the tremendous positive evidence on the side of a
teleological view.
Hartmann makes another peculiar charge in light of his own
point of view, this time against an impersonal teleology of
values . He says
,
Philosophical anthropomorphism can even avoid the destruc-
tive concert of an infinite person, it can satisfy
itself with the hypostasization /sicy7 of cosmic ends
axiologically postulated, hut otherwise existing without
any Vehicle and at the same time floating in air.
Hartmann' s own ethical system would seem to he in slight danger
from this charge. His view is essentially cased on a realistic
conception of the realm o r values arranged in a stratified
order, available for any person who can discover this realm.
These values in themselves seem to have a power of determination
all their own which determination the person can not escape.
The person can only discriminate between different values
arranged in a h' gher-lower order. Hartmann calls this deter-
mination by values themselves a primary determination. He says,
Here on every hand one is surrounded by the teleology
of values in ethical reality. It corresponds to what
in nature is the causal nexus. Like that it is a
nexus, a type of determination of the real.... The first
member--we mi^ht call it the primary determination--
is that of the subject by the value; it consists of the
1
Bowne, TH^,
2
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discerning, the sensing, the beholding of the value.
According to Hartmann, then, we have "a teleology of values in
w ethical reality" which teleology is "a type of determination
of the real," i.e. a determination "of the subject by values."
If this is not a hypostatization of ends floating around
without an adequate basis, it is a bit hard to conceive just
what sort of a situation Hartmann has in mind. Put then,
Hartmann is "coherent" rather than "consistent."
Hartmann's anthropomorphic argument against teleology
seems eventually to be reducible to h prejudice against the
idea of a conscious intelligence as the world ground. This
becomes clear when he charges that if one accepts teleology he
"tacitly accepts what no human thought can justify," i.e. a
consciousness "in control o" the real guidance of the process."
He ends the paragraph by saving, "Teleolo^ical metaphysics
must inevitably lead up to a personal creat or--that is, to the
one assumption which more than any other is beyond, all verifi-
cation." 3
A-ainst such an argument it is necessary to ask what is
meant by ver i Tication . If by verification Hartmann means abso-
lute certainty based on direct observation of sense data
gathered from the phenomenal world it would be necessary to
»
~1
Hartmann, ETH, I, 273.
2Ibid., 235-236.
3Ibid., 236.
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agree with him that such verification of the hypothesis of
creative intelligence is impossible. ^ut it is necessary to
^ point cut that certain verif ication is impossible for any
hypothesis whatsoever except that the latum of consciousness,
i.e. the "Situation Experienced" is immediately given. All
2
other hypotheses can only be relatively proved.
We do not have all available experience at hand, not to
mention future experience. We can only set/forth as relatively
true, dependent upon further experience, the hypothesis that is
most coherent in light of our total experience. This total
experience includes not only sense experience but also value
experiences, experiences of inner life, thought, previous
knowledge, etc. We can consider a belief as relatively veri-
fied if it meets the demands of coherence. This involves a
number of things.
According to the criterion of coherence, a proposition
is to be treated as true if (l) it is self-consist ent
,
(2) it is consistent with all the known facts of ex-
perience, (3) it is consistent with all other propo-
sitions held as true by the mind that is applying this
criterion, (4) it establishes explanatory and inter-
pretative relations between various parts of experience,
(5) these relations include all known aspects of ex-
perience and all known Droblems about experience in its
details and as a whole.
Using this criterion as a basis of verification, it would seem,
in light of the facts thus far considered, that the hvoothesis
» .
Brightman, PGR, 347-348.
2
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of an intelligent, conscious world ground is at least as
possible of verification as Hartmann 1 s opposing position.
Hartmann next claims that teleolo^ violates the basic
categorical law of dependence, i.e. the law of strength. It
has already been pointed out,"*" however, that this "basic law"
is by no means so categorica 1 ly certain as Hartmann seems to
think. Hartmann sees, and correctly, that a teleolo~ical
p
position does not do away with the causal nexus alto -ether.
Rather the causal nexus still assumes a most important role as
the means through which purpose is realized. It falls from
the predominant place accorded to it by Hartmann and becomes
the form of change under which man observes volitional causation
at work. Any other view tends to fall into the difficulties
set forth in the consideration of a causal monism. It would
seem far more coherent to view the causal nexus as the ex-
pression of basic intelligence at work controlling the given
nature of its consciousness than to view the causal nexus as an
incomprehensible impersonal flux no matter how regular the
flux should appear. With Hartmann it is necessary to agree
that categorical relation forms the crux of the matter. But
Hartmann 's categorical analysis seems somewhat inadequate in
light of additional facts which he seems to overlook.
''"See Chap. Ill, sec. 1, above.
2
Hartmann, ETH, III, 82.
3See Chap. Ill, sec. 2, above.
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Hartmann' s claim that a teleolo^ical conception of the
determination of the universe makes that determination a rigid
uniAvert \ble process is much m-re serious. If this were true
we should be forced either to -rive up unccndit ionally such a
view or else accept this as a fact and cease striving to
accomplish anything for ourselves. However, we have already
considered the idea that such a strict conception of the
finalistic nexun does not entirely conf or - to the facts. All
that is evident is that when two utterly opposed ends are set
up that demand the same channel of means for their realization
throughout the process, one or the other or "both tend to he
cancelled out. At least both cannot succeed. However, this
is not the whole story. The finalistic nexus is much more
flexible than it at first would seem. This is shown by two
common phenomena.
First, all of us experience the fact that the same means
can be used to quite different ends. The same train headed
for Chicago may act as nea^s of transportation for two
individuals, one planning to rob the First National Hank and the
other planning to endow the University of Chicago. Both of
these ends may be accomplished without the least threat to the
disruption of either in spite of their seeming conflicting
nature
.
Hartmann is partially willing to recognize this common use
of means on the purely human level. As pointed out,^" Hartmann
^See Chan. II, sec. 2, above.
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says
,
But alon~ with such there is, within certain limits,
an interlacing of divergent interests. This consists
of a c ommunit""- of means to different ends --of course
only in so far as these ends do not directly contra-
dict one another. The same elements can also be
reciprocally means an.'i ends for different finalistic
trends and therefore for different persons.
It would seem then that there Is no more reason why we,
as finite conscious bein-TS, could not use the volitionally
purposive means of the intelligent world around expressed in
the causal nexus towards our owa ends than there is reason why
we cannot use common means with other finite persons. To
anree further with Hartmann, there is the best of evidence
that we cannot accomplish ends of our own directly divergent
from those of the world ground. Man cannot directly violate
the law of gravity by walking off a higb building without
meetini an immediate cessation of all his ends. He cannot
continually violate the purposes of his own body without
eventually meeting the same destruction. He cannot even con-
tinually violate his own personality without ending up in an
institution for wrecked personalities. What nore evidence is
necessary 9 It would seem then that man can use Tod's means
as means for his own ends but that complete contradiction of
ends involving isolation of means does result in annihilation.
Second, it has already been pointed out th: :.t within a
finalistic nexus the end-means relationship is by no means as
1
Hartmann, ETH, I, 299.

strict aa Hartmann thinks. There is the best of empirical
evidence that, man at least can and continually does work
towards ends which expand and grow. The best example of this
is the fact that almost everyone works toward an ideal of
personality, which ileal as he approaches it grows, changes, and
exoands . If G-od or the world purposer is finite in the sense
that he is struggling to control the G-iven element of his
consciousness and if he "is eternally seeking new forms of
embodiment of the good," there is no particular reason why
lod's purpose should not be expanding and growing in much the
same way. On such an hypothesis there is every reason why
such should be the case. Evolution itself would seem to be
the best possible example of such a continually growing purpose
in the divine mind. At least we can say that Hartmann '
s
strict conception of teleology hardly conforms to the facts of
personal experience.
Hartmann's final argument, that a cosmic teleology would
make ethical activity on the part of man impossible, is already
partially answered by the above considerations. Man does have
material or means available with which to accomplish his own
ends. Acknowledging this, the only way in which man's morality
and freedom would be cancelled would be if he were a part of
lod himself. Only a pantheistic view could maintain this, and
^"See Chan. TTT, sec. 1, above.
Brightman, ?03, 333.

teleology ioes not necessarily imply pantheism. In fact the
pantheistic teleologlst is the exception and not the rule.
One of the greatest pantheists, Spinoza, denied teleology
altogether and considered God more in the nature of a cosmic
mechanism. Were we to conceive of man as a part of 3-od we
should he faced with the incoherencies Kartmann charges against
all teleological views. Then we should have to call the ig-
norance of man the ignorance of 3-od. Morality would be des-
troyed as we would have no wills of our own. G-ood and evil
would become indistinguishable since 3-od being all would have
both as his attributes though he himself is good.^" Put
fortunately we do not have to choose between pantheism and a
non-teleolo^ical universe.
Ha rtmann 1 s objections all the way through do not apply
to all forms of belief in Tod but rather seem to apply to a
more or less Calvinistic sort of divine autocrat. It is un-
necessary and much less coherent to hold to a belief in a
strict preordination by 3-od in which all that happens including
human action is in exact accordance with his will than to
hold to a view of an expanding developing G-od with whom man nay
work to bring about the further actualization of values.
Rather than cancel ethical existence a divine intelligence
makes such existence much more understandable and meaningful.
An objectivity of ideals is obtained by considering them as
"'"For more thorough discussion of the objections to pantheism
see Bowne, MET, 102-103, and Brightman, POR, 218-219.
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norms in the mind of God. Only on such an hypothesis does it
become understandable how value and ideal conscious beings
arose. It is quite inconceivable how ore could have values at
all if the universe were hostile or even indifferent to value.
Hartmann objects to such a view on the basis that it destroys
the autonomy of "oral values. He says that we must be able to
recognize values (ideals is more correct) as valid in their
own right, but
against the proposition religion sets up the anti-
thesis: every moral claim of the Ought is at bottom a
commandment of God, an expression of his will, and
only on this account does man, towards whom the
commandment is directed, feel its content to be a
moral value. For morality consists in life according
to the law of Gi-od. Hereby the moral values lose their
self-dependence and become heterono.mous . pThey are
simply given by the fiat of divine power.
It is by no means necessary that a theistic position
set up any such antithesis. All the theistic position claims
is that if ideals are to have any objective validity they
must have a place of residence beyond my human consciousness.
Hartmann, as was pointed out, seems to maintain the same
position but unfortunately he has declared what he calls
values instead of ideals to be objective but leaves no place
for their existence; rather they seem to be incomprehensibly
floating around in ethical reality. Values and ideals
^ri.-htman, ITP, 163-164.
2
Hartmann, ETH, III, 265.
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Tiust be values and ideals for some conscious person. "A value
wholly independent of personality is just as inconceivable as
a sensation of red wholly independent of consciousness.""^ It
would seem much more coherent to think of the objectivity of
ideals as meaning that true id.ea.ls are the ideals of a per-
fectly good will rather than simply the subjective ideals of
my consciousness or as objectively valid without a ground.
Furthermore, we would agree with Hartmann that these
ideals cannot be commandments on the part of 3-od which man
follows simply because they are G-od. 's commands. Rather they
constitute valid ends towards which 'j-od is working. In our own
experience we can discover these ends, but it is only as we
make them our own ends, parts of our own personalities that
they become v?lid for us. If, however, they did not have some
objective source beyond our experience it is highly improbable
that we should discover them at all,
With Hartmann it is necessary to agree that -"to a fan-
tastic mind the theory may be of greater importance; to a
philosopher the phenomenon is under all circumstances of greater
weight . " 'Ye would a^ree that this, if by phenomenon he means
the datum of experience. We would also agree that coherence,
as defined above, is far more important than mere consistency.
For these very reasons it must be pointed out that Hartmann 's
attack on theism is hardly of such a deva.stat in? nature that
Brightman, ITP, 163.
•
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theism is in danger of not recovering. In li^ht of the
evidence and of Hartmann's own inconsistency it would seem far
more coherent to postulate a purposing cosmic intelligence
than an impersonal world of chance configuration of the causal
nexus
.
h. Deterministic Pluralism.
Hartmann fully recognizes that he is setting forth at
least a dualism and that this dualism will be appfcdby qualitative
monists. There is, he feels, a traditional aversion to dualism
but that those holding this aversion can bring nothing in
suprort of it except the fact that the aversion is a fact. "A
pictured unity is more satisfying to our craving for system,
because it offers greater1 comprehens ibili ty . That is all....
But the demand for systemat ization is only a postulate, and in-
deed a rationalistic postulate. Such a unity, he argues, is
useless, is a merely forced unification that is neither compre-
hensible nor verifiable.
Hartmann goes on to ask if even a dualism is the ultimate
answer? To this question his answer is no. A dualism is an
extreme oversimplification. Categorical analysis reveals a
much wider system of realitv than just that controlled by the
causal nexus and the finalistic nexus. IFe must give up the idea
of dualism for a vast oluralism of determination. This
1
Hartmann, STH, III, 86-87.
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pluralism revea] s a gradual change from step to step rather
than a sharp "break as found in a dualism and in this way is
much more nearly unitary than any dualism.
Every deoartment of being has its own ^type of deter-
mination/; more correctly stated, every stratum of
being that is categorically higher has a type of
determination which is higher, every lower stratum
one that is lower.
Unfortunately we do not know what all these types of determination
are, particularly amont. t^e higher forms. If we were acquainted
with these added types language is so inadequate that we would
have to construct an entire new vocabulary to deal with them.
Nevertheless, he feels that some of these types can at least
be indicated.
To start below the causal nexus, Hartmann feels, that
"there is a special type of mathematical determination which
2penetrates all relations of quantity, size and measure." We
discover this type of determination in "the necessity of mathe-
matical inference." It is a necessary prerequisite of all
calculation. This type of determination ? s not merely a lav/,
either ideal as such or for thought, but rather an actual law
of existence. This law is much more elemental than the law of
causa.lity. It is not even a law of temporal process but as
"stronger" is prior to and accompanies temporality.
Below mathematical determination we find still a more
1Hartmann, ETK, III, 88.
Ibid.
•
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fundamental type. This very elemental type has only to do
"with the relations of c einn- in general. In the ideal sphere
of Being it is known as logical determination, and is ordi-
narily formulated as the 'lav/ of sufficient reason'." 1 This
is perhaps the basic and most universal type of determination.
It is taken up as a component of all the types above it as a
fundamental material, yet it always maintains its basic cate-
gorical strength.
The causal antinomv pointed out bv Kant has arisen largely
because we tend to think of the causal nexus and teleology as
diametrically opoosed yet directly in contact with each other.
Kartmann thinks that actually these two types of determination
are mediated by several strata of determinational types of whose
presence we may not know or be aware but v/hose existence cannot
be doubted simply because they are not known.
The determinational type of the causal nexus is simply
that connecting physical bodies and processes and as such is
relatively inorganic. Immediately above the causal nexus comes
a biological type of determinism. This tvpe of determinism
contains an unknown novelty that sets it off from the causal
nexus. Thinkers prone to teleolo-y continually mistake this
novelty for evidence of a finalistic nexus at work. These
thinkers are justified in holding that biological determination
is more than causal in nature, but they are not justified in
1Hartmann, ETH, III, 38.
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arbitrarily jumping to a flnalistic explanation.
The type is manifested in the peculiar systematic
functioning of the organism, in its self-preservation
and self -development , its reproduction, in the
merging of the individual with the life of the species,
and in the descent of the species, which is in truth
an ascent. It is as perverse to wish to explain these
phenomena by . mechanistic causation, as it is unjusti-
fiable to interpret them teleologieally without
further grounds for doing so.
Even though science tends to view this type of determination as
causal while t el eol ovists view it as flnalistic, nevertheless,
"at all events ontologically there is no doubt concerning the
2fact of the intermediate member.
The biological is only one of several types of determination
between causal and flnalistic . Immediately above the biological
emerges conscious determination. Consciousness is always
found "bound to an organism, originating and vanishing with
3
it." However it is something new and more than the biological.
The transition from organism, to consciousness is even more
difficult to follow than the transition from mechanism to
organism. Nevertheless that there is a different and definite
law of consciousness sannot be doubted even though we are not-
sure of its nature.
The distinctive note of its inner determi national
mode, in so far as it rises independently above that
of the organism, is not on that account comprehensible.
Rence we stand here face to face with a further, an
Hartmann, ETH, III, 90.
2
Ibid.
, 91.
3Ibid.
•i
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unknown and perhaps In principle an irrational -node
' of determination, the psychological node.
Flnallsm is not permissible even here though we are approaching
closer to its native realm.
Above the realm of consciousness, dependent on it but free
above it, begins the realm of spirit which itself is divided
into a number of strata. The person emerges above conscious-
ness. Personality is more than mere subjectivity, i.e. the
capacity of being a subject. Consciousness is its basis but
personality is free above it. usinc consciousness as its material.
It is in the realm of personality that teleology is valid.
This is why the teleology of man, his valuational
consciousness and his moral freedom cannot be fully
explained bv psychological factors. In it a deter-
mination of a unique and higher kind reigns, anchored
not in the sub j ect-- just as little as in the organism
or in th,o causal mechanism --but in the realm of
values
.
If we are to believe the passage referred to, a number of times
before to the effect that there is a primary co^itive deter-
mination bv values themselves not teleological in nature, 3 we
at least know one tyoe of determination above the teleology of
personality in the realm of the "still higher0 determinations.
The categorical laws of dependence anplv throughout the
det erminati onal stratification. Each lower stratum is stronger,
each higher is weaker. Thus,
1
Hartmann, ETH, III, 91.
2Ibid.
, 92.
3Ibid., I, 273.
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There is accordingly no personality, no teleology,
without consciousness; no consciousness without organic
life; no organic life without a causal structure of
nature (mechanism in the wide sense); no causal
mechanism without mathematical order: no mathematical
entity without the ontolo^lcally primal and base
relat i ons
.
Assuming for a moment that Hartmann ' s analysis is correct,
lust what is the result 0 At most he has a rigid stratified
svstem in which, his consideration of biological determinism to
the contrary, development is incomprehensible. At best he has
a theory of emergent evolution in which the manner of or the
reason for enercence is totally unexplainable . In his un-
conscious evolution what possible reason can be assigned for
mathematical entities emerging out of " ontologically primal
and base relations," for the causal nexus rising out of
mathematical relations, for organic life arising out of the
causal nexus, and so on ad infinitum ? Vifhat can be the basis of
the energy and activitv of being? Hartmann does not even
resort to a vital orincipal within, such as ^ergson's elan vital.
All the criticisms brought against an impersonal causal monism
considered in section two of t'~is chapter apply to everything
in Fartmann's system below the level of willing personality,
lino pointr- out, "Hartmann' s argument is too exclusively analytic;
his lo?.ic is too atomistic to be convincing . " Fartmann has
stratified the universe into so many atomic kinds of determination
1
Hartmann, ETH, III, 92.
2
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and in spite of his categorical laws can find no principle to
put it "back together. The laws of material and freedom are
cancelled by the law of strength as far as controlling and
or^anizin^r functions are concerned except in very narrow
realms. If the work of organization deoended upon the work of
the higher then human personality would have to be organizing
agent of the entire universe, ^perience flatly denies this.
If the organization proceeds from the lower determinations
Hartmann's laws of freedom and material are violated. The
bricks wou" d build the house. At any rate according to
Hartmann the house emerges out of the bricks from movement by
the bricks. Such a view seems slightly incoherent.
Actually since there is no principle of development
within his system, Hartmann's world is a rigid sort of thing
all of which must have existed from all time to all time without
emergence of anything new except, perhaps, varying forms within
the biological level. Thus, unconsciously he falls into the
cult of the eternal. Hartmann's criticism of monistic views
as based on a craving 'or a pictural unity strangely enough
seems to apply with much more force to his own system. Hart-
mann's idea of truth and coherence seems to be based entirely on
his categorical laws of dependence, particularly the law of
strength. lino points out,
Hartmann depends on this categorical law... as the
criterion of truth. With him this law rules our
thought and intention; onl" in accordance with it
can we hold anything before our minds,- but never
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without it or in opposition to it.
Somehow this seems extremely dogmatic and incoherent, parti-
cularly in light of the d cubtfulness of the validity of these
laws
.
Hartmann's categorical ' law, or any and every law in
philosophy, must be judged by its adequacy to inter-
pret all the facts that there are in experience as a
whol e
.
It would certainly Been that Hartmann's principle fails to inter-
pret a very important portion of the facts, e.g. the facts of
development
.
Even if Hartmann's arrangement of a pearaice of the
different realms of existence is true, some sort of an acting
a^ent , a teleological beinc?., seems necessary for coherent ex-
planation. Action is impossible without an acting agent. Action
by itself is an abstraction. This would seem to hold true of
everv strata of determination Hartmann mentions. Determination
without a determiner is pure hypostatization. No determiner
apoears in T-artmann ' s system until he reaches the level of
personality. Even consciousness for Hartmann seems to be
purposelessly determined. The entire realm of nature seems to
be constituted by agentless activity. Such a view is hardly
coherent
.
Thus Hartmann, far from proving the uselessness and non-
existence of a 7-od, has rather pointed to the necessity of an
1
Iino, CHE, 152.
2Ibid., 153.
f4
Intelligent causal agent if we are to' understand our universe
at all
.
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CHAPTER IV
THE PLACE OF TELEOLOGY IN THE REALM 01? ETHICS
1. The Relation of Teleology to Freedom.
Rather than consider systematically Hartmann's treatment
of the problem and meaning of freedom which occupies the entire
third volume of the Ethics it seems wise to deal with it only
where it touches closely the problem of4eleology . However,
it must be remembered that the problems of freedom and, human
teleology are very closelv related throughout so that when one'
talks about freedom he generally has in mind the ability of the
individual to work towards ends of his own choosing or at
least that he approves.
Hartmann insists that freedom must mean human determination
if it is to have any meaning with • empirical backing . Unfort-
unately, however, freedom has too often been taken to mean
not a determinism by the individual but indet erminis.r. of the ;
individual's will. Hartmann maintains that "negative freedom
as mere 'freedom from something' is altogether a false concept."
It is hardlv correct to speak of freedom of choice and certainly
never of freedom of choice in a negative sense. If the
choice between two things were completely undetermined it
1
Hartmann, ETH, III, 48.

would never be made. Interest, motive, desire, or reason
and sometimes all these enter into each choice as the deciding
factors. We always '~ave reasons either r ood or had for the
choices we make. Hartmann points this out by saying,
V'hen the will has chosen, it presents itself un-
mistakably as determined. The act of choice itself
is clear evidence of unmistakable determined ness . If
the decisive factor is lacking in the will, it does
•not choose. Hence if it chooses, one can no longer
say it is free in the sense of negative freedom of
choice
.
Thus freedom of the will involves not mere freedo i of choice
but ability to choose in light of determination and the ability
to impose this determination upon the environment. The will
chooses with ends in mind, in the service of ends either ^ood
or bad. It is the ability to make such choices, tqwork
towards ends that, is the major factor in positive freedom.
"Free will is not undetermined will, but nrecisely a will that
is determined and chooses determinantly
Hartmann feels that it is only when freedom of the will
is understood in this positive manner that the seeming contra-
diction between causal necessity and freedom can be solved.
This contradiction can be solved if determination and freedom
are shown not be to opposed but complementary. In order to
show this, "moral freedom must originally mean not independence,
indeterminateness , that is, not at all 'freedom from something',
1Hartmann, ETH, III, 49.
2
Ibid.

but precisely a determlnateneas sul generis ." Then drily can
freedom of the will be considered as it really is, i.e. positive
Kan*, Hartmann points out, made c^reat strides to?/ards a
positive view of freedom in his solution of the causal antinomy.
Kant assumed in the antithesis that the cosmic process is
throughout causally determined. "There is no freedom, but
everything in the world ts.kes place entirely according to the
2laws of nature." Thus the regularity of the causal nexus
would seem to have no exception if the antithesis can be success
fully proven. Man as a creature of the natural world is not
excepted from it. Tan is not free from the causal nexus , and,
accordingly. Hartmann insists there can be no freedom in the
negative sense for, if there were, a gap in the causal nexus
would be the result. Yet if there is any cosmic regularity such
a gar cannot exist. The question then would seem to be settled
in a negative manner.
It is otherwise if there is a 'freedom in the posi-
tive sense, 1 that is, if there is a positive order of
the will together with the order or nature, a deter-
minant which itself is not contained in the causal
course of the world, but which in the will of man
enters into the world of appearance.-^
Such a positive order of the will is only possible if man not
only belongs to nature but simultaneously belongs to a higher
realm with a lav/ of his own. Kant asserted this by claiming
1
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1that man is not only a natural being but is also a rational
one
.
While Hartmann is unwilling to accept the letter of Kant's
solution in terms of' phenomena, noumena, and idealism in
general, he does feel that Kant's method of answering the
question is entirely correct.
In so far as it can be shown that there is one point in
the world of appearance where the determination of an intelligent
being, i.e. man, has penetrated and set in motion a new set of
appearances man's freedom can be proven. Such an instance
would be an intervention into the causal nexus by a power not
belonging to the causal nexus as such but causing changes in
the causal nexus. This is positive freedom and means not freedom
from but freedom to act by the will in light of its own manner
of determination. It is a plus and not a minus of determination.
The type of determination peculiar to the will and personality
is finalistic determination. It is in human teleology th:r.t
freedom finds its meaning.
Kant showed the possibility of the coexistence of freedom
of the will and "an all-pervading causal nexus . " Hartmann
^•oes on to insist that in irrder that freedom of the will may
exist at all it is absolutely necessary that the causal nexus
co-exist with the finalistic nexus.
To state the point more exactly, a free will with
its finalistic mode of ef^icacv is altogether possible
1Hartmann, ETH, III, 73.

only in a world entirely determined causally .... in
a world which is not so determined not only is the
teleology of a free will m utter impossibility, "but
equally so is all teleology. "
Thus man's freedom turns out to he a result of his unusual
position as resident in the causal nexus but with a type of
determination of his own which he may impose upon that nexus.
As a natural being, even to his inmost desires and
repulsions, he is determined causally, a plaything
of the eternal powers of Nature, of powers overwhelming-
ly superior and operating both through him and alto-
gether irrespective of him.
Man however is also a person and as a person Kartmann feels
that he is a earrier of a higher sort of determination emanating
from the real"-1 of ideals. In the very act of sensing these man
finds himself partially determined by a claim' of the ideals ex-
pressed in terns of an ourht . It is this type of determination
which man shows in purposive activity . Man drawing his ends
from what he feels to be of value .transforms that value into
reality thus creating in actuality what the causal nexus by
itself could never bring about. By purpose man is able to
control forces blind and aimless in themselves, to make these
forces means to his ends. In this commitment to ideal ends
man is able to.develop his own moral being. In the fact that
man is able to determine final istically his freedom exists and
finds meaning. This is a far m ort no bie tyoe of freedom than
any indet erminism could possibly be.
Hartraann, STH, III, 73.
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Hartmann seens to be in basic agreement with most modern
thinners in the field of ethics in maintaining that freedom
does not mean indeterminism . He would agree with Urban 's
contention that "responsibility. . .does not. ..Imply freedom in
the sense of i ndetermin i sm . It is precisely such a conception
of freedom which makes real responsibility impossible." Urban
defines freedom as follows: "Freedom means simply the ability to
have conscious motives, to understand the meaning of our actions,
and to have the power to modify them in the direction of some
end or ideal." Tith this he would agree except that he would
insist that these ends or ideals themselves tend to force a
type of determinism on the individual thoumh the 'individual may
consciously work toward a lower ideal rather than a higher one.
In so far as he does work towards the lower he incurs guilt.
Hartmann and Urban would basically disagree, however, as
to the reason why man is free. Urban insists, "Man is free
because he is part of a world or nature, the ultimate character
of which is not determinism but freedom.""^ Hartmann on the
other hand insists that man's freedom can onl TT exist if nature
is not free but thoroughly causallv determined.
Perhaps one of the reasons for this insistence on cosmic
determinism is the fact that Fartmann in his consideration of
"""Urban, FCF, 404.
2 Ibid., 40 c .
3 Ibid., 416.
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Kant's third antinomy completely overlooks the thesis as Kant
stated it. In the thesis Kant was not dealing particularly
with the freedom of nan "but with freedom in the cosmos. Kant
says, " Causality* according to the laws of nature, is not the
only causality from which all the phenomena of the world can be
deduced. In order to account for these phenomena it is necessary
also to admit another causality, that of freedom." Kant's
proof of the thesis tends to show that mechanical causality
alone leads to the infinite regress and lack of completion.
If Hart mann were a little more willing to consider the side
of the thesis and realize that not necessity but uniformity of
2purposive experience" tends to be the more coherent explanation
3
of the causal order perhaps he would "be more willing to agree
with Urban. The causal antinomy can be solved just as easily
on the basis of a teleological world ground as on the basis of
cosmic determinism so long as man is able to use the uniformity
of divine purpose for his own ends. The solution is fundamentally
the same, i.e. man imposes his determination upon his environ-
ment, but the basis of the causal order itself in a teleological
world theory finds some explanation,' which explanation tends to
be lacking in Hartmann.
Brightman's theory of freedom, call " freedomism, has less
"Weene, KS
,
195.
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4
Bright man, :.X, 277.

128
in common with Hartmann than "oes Urban *fi theory. Brightman
defines his term as follows:
By the theory of free will or freedomism is meant the
view that a given act of choice is not unequivocally
determined by the immediately preceding situation, but
that the person himself determines his choice by a
spontaneous, selective act.
Hartmann would ab.iect to the term "spontaneous;" however, that
the difference between the two is not as striking as it would
at first appear is made evident by Brightman 's further quali-
fication .
Freedomism grants that every free act has necessary
consequences and that the situation in which the act
of choice occurs determines the possibilities from
which selection can be made; but it denies that the
choice itself is externally determined. Its causation
is internal to the act and purely personal, not im-
personal or external to it.
Hartmann would certainly agree that the cause of the act is in-
ternal or at least not external in the sense of being a part
of the causal order. He makes this clear when he says of the
order of will that it has "a determinant which itself is not
contained in the causal course of the world."
Hartmann' s language is unfortunately confusing. .'.'hen he
says that freedom of the will is not undetermined but is pre-
cis el y "a will that is determined and chooses determinately ,
"
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he would seem actually to implv a lack of choice between
possibilities presented. However it becomes evident that he
does not necessarily mean lac': of choice but rather that
choice is always made among the various possibilities for some
reason, either good or bad. The possibility of either choice
is still there though the probability of one of the alternative
may not be as great as that of choosing the other. That either
choice is open to a certain extent he makes clear when he says,
"There is no freedom to be good which is not at the same time
a freedom to be bad."^ At another place he says,
Purposive action, the highest point of all activity,
indicates at the same time the ctreatest scope for
morality and immorality .... To be suspended thus, with,
both vistas continually before one,, to be menaced from
the depths within, and to be a menace to others, through
one's own highest and noblest capacity, this is what
it is to be a moral creature, to be a man.... He must
not sink into evil, but must retain the capacity for
evil. Foe without it there exists no capacity for
goodness.
Hartmann would come close to agreeing with Paulsen's statement,
"Man. . .is not determined by his impulses . but he determines
himself by ideas of ends
, though he would add that the possi-
bility of choosing ends in the light of impulses cannot be
denied.
On the other hs.nd with Everett he would differ radically.
Everett claims paradoxically that freedom means complete deter-
mination, not of but bv the will. He says,
^Hartmann, ETH, IT, 176.
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And just as men are truly free in the state only when
all are obedient to wise laws, so men are morally free
only when they are completely determined in their
coniuct by the requirements of a true moral standard.
To the extent even to which one hesitates between right
and wrong, or coquets with evil, one is not morally
free, for in this case the evil solicits, attracts,
influences one.
Such complete 'determination Hartmann maintains would not be
moral at all.
Hartmann claims that man "is the carrier of another sort
of determination, which emanates from the ideal realm of
2
values; however he fortunately adds that this determination
fay values is only partial. Here a.gain he confuses ideals and
values. The question is whether values or the realm of ideals
ever determine. In one sense it may be possible to say they
do. Certainl;' as man interprets his value experiences and sets
up general concepts of experiences which he values he tends to
act in light of these concepts or ideals. Also as personality
develoos "new oua.ll
a
emerge, such as feeling of moral obli-
gation, of aesthetic taste, and. religious obligation, which
come to be recognized as imp er a t i v e norms ." That nan should
act in the light of his highest ideals and of these imperative
norms goes without saying, but th:.t these actually determine
his action is entirely a different sort of thing. If they
belong to a scosrste ^°eal realm ^oart fr^m man as ^a^tnan 1^
1
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would seem to imply and if these ideals themselves are' active
such a view might be possible. But if these ideals as such
are ideas fS suchKthough the mind is active in forming or dis-
covering them, as ideas, the-- are passive, are part of and
belong to some mind no matter how objective they be as norms
in the mind of ~'-od. Thus it would seem that while a person may
determine in light of ideals it is hardly correct to speak
of the ideals as determiners. Such manner of speaking if not
hypostatization tends very easily to lead to it. It would seem
far more coherent then to speak of freedom as man's ability to
choose and determine in the light of ends as a teleological
bein-"-
.
2. Teleology in the Realm of Value.
Hartmann .analyzes the field of values into different strata
arranged in a higher-lower order. This stratification is
essentially based on the categorical laws of dependence in the
same manner as dependence of determinati onal types. Among the
first strata of values is a series which Hartmann calls "The
p
Values which Condition Contents." These values are very closely
related to, if not are, t-e higher instrumental values. Yet
Hartmann rightly feels that they have certain definite intrinsic
Dualities or contents about them. These values, as is the case
1
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throughout the realm of values for Hartrnann, are discovered
to be values "by inttfttim. ks comp.-.red with a lower group
called the antithetical values Hartrnann says of conditional
values, "Here are contents which anyone easily sees to be values.
They come into much more intimate contact with our intuition."''"
These values which condition contents include life, conscious-
ness, activity, suffering, strength, freedom, foresight, and
purposive efficacy. It is not within the scope of this paper
to follow Hartrnann 's analysis of the field of values, or what
more correctly he should have ca" led ideals, yet to understand
more adequately his conception of teleology it is necessary to
look briefly into the particular teleological values. In this
section freedom, foresight, and purposive efficacy come directly
under the heading of teleology.
Equally important with the values of consciousness,
activity, and strength and categorically above these Hartrnann
finds the "unprecedented value of volitional freedom of the
will, personal self-determination in directing the aim of
actions morally intentional." The ideal of freedom as such is
entirely independent of the old problem of whether or not there
is freedom. The present problem simply is whether or not
freedom is a value. That the ideal of freedom exists Hartrnann
feels is beyond question. He says, "This is an ideal form, like
"'"Hartrnann, ETH, II, 126.
2
Ibid., 144.
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all other values; that is, It exists even though there be no
carrier of it in reality, and even if there should actually be
no real will that was free.""*"
Essentially freedom involves the rising of initiative
above the blind occurrences of the causal order. As such its
value cannot be denied. The very fact that philosophers have
searched so continually for metaphysical proof of freedom of
the will speaks for the worth of freedom. No matter how
extreme some psychologists and philosophers become in their
denial and denunciation of freedom man cannot give up the con-
cept for to do so v/ould rob him of his moral being. .".an seems
to believe inherently in his freedom. "He has even a deep
consciousness that he is free. He feels that, even if he is
not free, he ought to be. For he ought to be a moral being,
2
a person." To denounce freedom, to give up the consciousness
that one is free, is to deny self-hood. What could be a more
basic evidence for that freedom!
The next highest value and one also having a direct
bearing on teleology is the value known as foresight. Man as
simply conscious being can hardly be called practical. He
first tends to become practical when he is able to look forward,
to anticipate the future, to plan for it. ran must raise his
head above mere contemplation of the present. Hartmann calls
Hartmann, ETH, II, 144.
2
Ibid., 145.
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foresight the "intuitive vision in man." In its highest
forms foresight becomes prophecy. Because of foresight man is
able to move forward conscious of goals and ends. Man cannot
live in the present alone without utter stagnation. Man
belongs to the future and the future is the only thin- that
really belongs to him. The past is closed. Nothing can change
it. In a very real sense the present is closed as well as the
past. Hartmann says,
Nor is the present to be changed any more than the
past, it already has its irrevocable determination in
itself. Only that which has not yet entered into the
present, that which is coming to us --for this is the
meaning of the_word ' zukunftig ' --can be guided, can
be influenced.
All activity and striving must be for the future. If conscious-
ness were closed to the future the result would have to be a
sort of passive inactivity, a blind acceptance of whatever
comes. It is thought which lifts the veil of the future though
it only be a slight and imperfect lifting. Yet it is only through
this imperfect vision that a person through his will is able
to execute his plans. No matter how small the forward glimpse
may be it is of inestimable value. The fact that man has often
provided 3-od with divine providence anal foreordinat ion shov/s the
high value placed upon foresight.
However Hartmann is very careful to point out that man in
so providing Grocl with foreordinati on has actually cancelled his
1
Hartmann, ETH
,
II, 143.
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own ethical being and converted Human foresight into positive
iisvalue. Unfortunately Hartmann thinks that any idea of 3-od
must include preordination (as pointed out above) and thus
denies the existence of a teleological Sod altogether. If
teleology really implied human predestination it would be
necess-'T 1 ' to agree with him. Fortunat ely it is possible to
hold to belief in 3-od without human predestination. Actually
it is necessary to as-.ree with Hartmann that if the universe and
man were completely determined so that man's will could effect
no changes, whether this be a strict mechanistic or- a strict
teleological determinism, foresight would be a positive dis-
value. In a world man can change, however, foresight is of
extreme value to man.
Yet even in a world where man can effect changes the value
of foresight has a limit above w ich it becomes a disvalue.
If T.an knew everything ahead of him the weight of the future
would be more than his moral strength could bear, han has to
have a certain amount of irresponsibility and lightheadedness
in order to maintain his sanity. Hartmann rightly points out,
"The full attribute of divinity would overwhelm him. And
accordingly the full measure of what is value in itself
pbecomes for him a Iisvalue." -
Mext in order comes the particular value of teleology
For4 ' fuller discussion see Chap. Ill, sec. 3.
2
Hartnann, ETH, II, 151.
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itself, the value of purposive efficacy to use Hartmann '
s
term. Freedom and foresight have little meaning apart from
teleology. Teleology is the value that makes personality
really possible. "It is the finish and crown of all the
partial factors, and it is also the culmination of their
valuational qualities." Hartmann thinks that man is the only
being in which teleology is found. Thus for him it is the
peculiar work of personality and gives man his qualitative
superiority over every other power or thing in the universe.
In teleology lies man's power.
The value of teleology is not restricted to one step
of the finalistic nexus nor is it exhausted by the process as
a whole. Value adheres to eac 1^ stage of the finalistic nexus.
The capcity to set up ends, to choose goals, is a tremendous
va 1 ue . Of equal and complementary value is the capacity to
find means for the realization of the ends. And of not less
value is the ability to guide the actual realization of the
ends in the causal nexus. Teleology involves not only an inner
freedom of the will to set uo ends and will its own determinati
but also an outward freedom making oossible the carrying out of
the ends in the stream of events. Man is avle to turn natural
forces and orocesses into his service. It is man's teleology
that makes him akin totthe divine.
Man's teleology gives hirn the power to actualize value.
T~
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Only thus does man "become a moral being. Hartmann points out,
Thus he fulfils his metaphysical role of mediator
between the realm of values and reality. But at the
same time he becomes thereby the bearer of moral
values. For it is to acts distinguished by such
teleology that the qualities of good and bad pertain.
The intrinsic as well as the instrumental value of teleology
becomes strikingly evident.
With morality teleology brings in another equally important
though ominous concept, that of responsibility and guilt. Un-
bounded purposive activity is coordinate with unbounded respon-
sibility. As Hartmann points out.
Guilt falls upon him who has power. The idea of 3-od
as the being who predestines everything is the idea
of unlimited responsibility, at the same time also
the idea of an unlimited capacity for being respon-
sible .
Unfortunately man has no such unlimited power of responsibility.
The degree to which man can bear responsibility is definitely
limited. '.Yhen that limit is crossed nan collapses and cries for
release. To add to the misfortune, man's capacity for con-
trolling events often far exceeds his capacity for responsibilit
Thus moral e.nd mental collapse is not oart i cu 1 arly uncommon.
Accordingly teleology is both the most powerful and the
most dangerous of gifts given to man. Teleolo-*r r is of value
only within the limits of man's endurance; beyond this it is a
curse
.
1
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Only how he shall play the game, how he shall use the
gift, is within his power. Arid it happens that the
gift, the more he is conscious of the power which is
in his hands, leads him astray, lures him to ever
higher stakes. But in this frenzy he 3oes not "become
aware o f the limits of* his strength until after the
game is lost for him.
Yet, for all the danger involved, teleology is the most precious
of all of man's attributes. His very being as man depends
upon it. The loss of purposive efficacy means moral and spiri-
tual death. It is the tool of the gods and must be used
wisely.
Kartmann 1 s emphasis throughout his consideration of value
is on intuition or valuational feeling as the source of our
knowledge of values. lino points out the centrality of this
concept in Hartmann 's system. He says, "Hartmann- holis that
throu~h '.'.'ertgefuhl alone can we grasp valuational structures
2
which are ideal objects. In support of this he oxuotes a very
interesting passage from the German in the Ethik as follows
:
"Wert strukturen sind eben ideale G-egenstande
,
jenseits alles
realen seins und Nichtseins, auch jenseits 3es realen "Vert-
sefuhls, welches allein sie erfasset."
This emphasis on Wertgefilhl has become evident in the section
on the "values which condition contents."' The values
1
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For a full and adequate treatment of the centrality of
*
of freedom., foresight, and purposive efficacy are intuited.
And yet even within this brief section the conf ] ict between
coherent thought ar.d intuition becomes evident. Hart-nann
attempts to hold on to both. He defines foresight as "the in-
tuitive vision in man." rut on the same page he says, "Thought
lifts the veil which is spread over the future." Now it may
be quite true that thought and intuition are not antithetical.
It Is more correct to speak of them as complementary. Put they
-
are net the same thing. Intuitions as immediate perceptions
include all sense perceptions and value perceptions. Thought
is the attempt to coherently relate these intuitions, to dis-
cover their meaning, to check their accuracy and adequacy,
and to infer from them. Judgments about the future are always
inferences. Accordingly Hartmann is much more correct when he
asserts that thought ] ifts the veil of future than when he
speaks about foresight as intuition. Intuitions are always
4
Situations Experienced. The future beyond the present time-
Span is never experienced but only inferred.
The situation is made more confusing b' r Hartmann' s failure
jfert -efuhl to Hartmann ' s entire ethical system with critical
evaluation of the concept see lino, CHE, 44-64.
1
Hartmann, ETH
,
II, 148.
2Ibid.
Brightman, PGR, 125.
4
Ibid., 34^, for use of the term Situation Experienced.

to distinguish between ideals, and values. He would be ricrbt
in saying that value experience is a form of intuition, but he
is not talking about values when considering freedom, fore-
sight, and purposive efficacy above, but rather about ideals,
particularly when he talks about freedom as valuable whether
any one is free or not. True ideals and true values can only
be recognized after coherent verification by thought. Thus
while values and. ideals, as derived from values
t
may be originally
intuitively discovered, yet as true or adequate they are dis-
covered not by intuition but by thought.
Hartmann 1 s assertion that the present cannot be changed
o
any more than the past"" seems to be an extreme over-statement.
Actually all change must be brought about in the present. It
is in the present that change is initiated. It is the present
that the person must organize and revise in order to bring
about ends vet in the future for their realization. The future
as such is - ret non-existent exceot in thought. The realization
of an end itself will not take place in the future but in a
future become present. Thus instead of sayin^ that the
present cannot be changed he should have said that only the
present can be changed but that present change has a future
reference
.
?7ith Hartmann it seems necessarv to agree that teleology
Brightman, PGR, 93.
2
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or purposive efficacy is the most Important attribute of man.
This attribute might "be wholly dangerous and destructive if
reason were not als^ present "but reason without teleology would
be helpless if it could exist at all. As Hart::iann points out,
teleology imposes tremendous responsibility upon man but the
ability to set up ends and bring a.bcut their fulfilment is
worth anv orice. Purposive efficacy is the key to civilization,
culture, and more basically to humanity itself. If it were
necessary as Hartmann thinks it is to give up the- idea of lod
in order to preserve this human power, the price would not be
too high* Fortunately, however, no such drastic step need be
taken. Rather teleology is enriched by the concept of a
purposive 3-od. Humanity as able to carry on purposive action
has the tremendous and continual opportunity to work with Q-od
for the increase and conservation of values. Thus man does
share with the divine the attributes of divinity.
*
142
SUMMARY IN THE FORM OF CONCLUSIONS
(1) Hartmann's analysis of the finalistic nexus into a
three-stage process, i.e. the setting up of ends., the review of
means, and the actual working out of the realization of the ends
in the causal nexus, seems to he in harmony with much recent
thought on the subject and- to be consistent in the light of
the common experience of purposive agents
.
(2) Teleology or purposive action is one of the most im-
portant abilities of man and truly makes man akin to the divine.
Whether or not purposive action is peculiar to man in this
world or whether certain of the lower animals also are pur-
posive does n n t in anv v/av detract from the importance of
purposive action for man.
(3) Throughout the Ethics Hartmann's tendency to confuse
values and ideal's leads to the failure to distinguish between
situation of value and general concepts of situations which
man values and uses as ends to he realized. Ideals may assume
the position of imperative norms of conduct by which it is
possible to judge present values. Consequently Hartmann,
instead of thinking in terms of objectivity of value, would have
been :nore accurate had he used the term objectivity of ideals.
(4) Accident as a teleological concept is confined to
accident for man unless there is a cosmic teleological agent
in which case it would he possible to speak of contingent
*t
»
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happenings from the divine point of view, particularly in the
case of unforeseen action on the part of free human beings,
(5) Hartmann 's basic categorical law of dependence, i.e.
the law of stren-rth, is not coherent with the facts of experience
The higher is dependent on the lower only in the sense that the
higher cannot violate its material, "but the lower is dependent
upon the higher for its very meanincr. , for its use and develop-
ment, and, in the sense that the causal nexus can only "be
ultimately explained in terns of a more than human volitional
causality, for its very existence.
(6) Any causal monism or any theory which holds a major
part of the universe to be determined only by the causal nexus
is faced with the difficult problem of interaction, hartmann
fails to meet this problem. The most coherent explanation of
interaction would seem to be in terms of a conscious, intelligent
purposive worldi-^round or person, which concept Hartmann com-
pletely rejects.
(7) Hartmann 1 s charge that cosmic teleology would auto-
matically destroy man ' s • freedom and autonomy because of the un-
alterable nature of the finalistic nexus does not seem to be
justified. Purposive action as experienced by man is not as
unalterable without disruption as Hartmann maintains. The ex-
perience of developing purpose and common use of means by
different teleolo-sical agents with different ends in view shows
the flexibility of the finalistic nexus.
t*
i4i
(8) The existence of natural law, the phenomenon of
interaction, + he facts of evolution and emergence, the friend-
liness of tv e un' verse towards value, the objectivity of ideals,
and. the existence of other purposive agents are all evidences
pointing to the existence of a cosmic teleological agent or Q-od
as the most coherent principle of explanation, Hartmann '
s
objections to the contrary notwithstanding
(9) Hartmann 's deterministic pluralism seems to stratify
the universe into a rigid system in which the lower dominates
the higher, development and emergence, if possible, remain
utterly mysterious, and blind chance configuration is the ruling
principle in spite of his insistence that there is no such
thing as chance occurrence.
(10) Freedom is the ability of man to impose his will,
determined in the light of his own chosen ends, upon himself
and his environment. -artmann, while seaming to deny the
freedom of choice actually strongly defends it by insisting that
man must always have the possibility before him of choosing
the lower instead of the higher, the bad instead of the good,
if he is to be held responsible for his actions.
(11) Freedom, fores ight, and purposive efficacy are not
only the three highest instrumental values but have a high
intrinsic worth of their own. As ideals they have objective
status in the mind of -od and maintain their high worth for him
even if all men were to allow themselves to become simply

creatures of their environments and thus lose these most
precious prerenui n it es of moral hein^.
•
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